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Note: Mental Health: A Model Statute to Regulate the
Administration of Therapy Within Mental Health Facilities
I. INTRODUCTION
A treating physician has traditionally exercised exclusive
control over the administration of therapy in mental health
facilities.1 Mental patients have generally not been granted the
right to participate in their own treatment decisions, even to
refuse an unwanted therapy.2 Due to scientific and technological developments, 3 new and powerful therapies have proliferated
1. See New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 70 Misc. 2d
944, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Beresford, Judicial Review
of Medical Treatment Programs,12 CAL. W.L. Rzv. 331 (1976); Friedman,
Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental Institutions
and Prisons, 17 ARz. L. REV. 39, 41 (1975); Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Car. L. REv. 755, 775-78
(1969).
2. This example highlights the manner in which mental patients
have been deprived of certain rights. See generally AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DIsABLED AND T=E LAW 175 (rev. ed. S.
Brakel & R. Rock 1971) [hereinafter cited as THE MENTALLY DIsABLED
After outlining the "rights of hospitalized patients,"
THE LAW].
m
this study concludes that these rights are not adequately protected by
existing legislation.
Though it is true that hospital doctors and administrators are
often in the best position to determine which freedoms or restrictions are most likely to benefit the patient's medical needs, it
remains the function of the law to circumscribe the decisionmaking powers of hospital officials. In many states, owing to the
absence of legal guidelines and reviewing machinery, hospital
officials in effect have unlimited discretion in areas ranging from
correspondence, visitation, and employment to mechanical restraints and major medical treatment. The fact that decisions
in most or all of these areas involve considerations other than
purely medical ones reinforces the point that patient rights are
not sufficiently protected.
Id. at 171.
3. For example, extensive technological developments are taking
place in the field of behavior modification and control:
The chemicals and electronic hardware of behavior-control technology are proliferating even faster and more powerfully than
are psychological tools. The host of tranquilizing and energizing
drugs already on the market represents the bare infancy of an
industry that will soon produce drugs much more precisely capable of steering people's -moods and emotions and, soon thereafter, of affecting important parts of their intellects, such as
memory. Electronic miniaturization and improvements in surgery increasingly exploit discoveries of the exact locations in the
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in recent years, exacerbating the problem of patient nonparticipation. Physicians presently have at their disposal a wide array
of organic therapies 4 which, although highly beneficial in treating some forms of mental illness,5 have the potential to produce
brain where various behavioral functions are managed; skillful
invasion of these sites permits interference with the functions;
radio remote controls over epileptic seizures, sexual desire, and
speech patterns are already operational. Few people yet have
thought much on the long-raige prospects of such technology.
See Moya & Achtenberg, BeP. LONDON, BEHAVIOR CONTROL 5 (1969).
havior Modification: Legal Limitations on Methods and Goals, 50 NOTRE
DAM LAW. 230, 233 (1974). Rapid technological development poses sev-

eral dangers: new techniques may be used before their impact is fully
understood, or before the legal and ethical implications of their use have
been explored. This emphasizes the significance of a right to refuse
treatment and highlights the importance of designing a regulatory procedure to deal with new types of therapy. See § 4 of the Model Stat*ute developed in this Note; text accompanying notes 102-04 infra.
4. Organic therapy is defined in § 2(c) of the Model Statute developed in this Note. The term generally refers to procedures that
affect or alter an individual's thought patterns, sensations, feelings, and
perceptions through chemical, electrochemical, or surgical means. This
Note includes "conditioning techniques" in the definition of organic
therapy. See Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control:
Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REv.

237, 244 (1974). Although this may slightly distort the concept of organic therapy, the use of one term to represent the entire range of therapies a state might choose to regulate facilitates discussion.
The nature and effect of various organic therapies have been discussed by numerous legal commentators. For more detailed descriptions,
see Beresford, supra note 1, at 336-44 (description of available organic
therapies and an outline of their medical objectives); Schwartz, In the
Name of Treatment: Autonomy, Civil Commitment, and Right to Refuse
Treatment, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 808, 812-17 (1975) (review of chemo-

therapy, electroshock therapy, and psychosurgery as treatments administered during short periods of hospitalization on outpatient basis); Note,
Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?"
"Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616, 619
(1972) [hereinafter cited as ConditioningPrisonersand Mental Patients];
Comment, Legislative Control of Shock Treatment, 9 U.S.F.L. REV., 738,
739 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Control of Shock Treatment].

5. 'Shapiro, supra note 4, at 243-44. For example, it is generally
accepted that electroshock treatment relieves some serious depressions.
Beresford, supra note 1, at 338. With respect to psychosurgery, there is
some evidence that selective destruction of portions of the frontal lobe,
hypothalamus, thalamus, cingulate gyrus, and amygdala dampens violent or aggressive behavior. Id. at 341. Drugs may be prescribed
to modify disturbed behavior or to alter discomforting moods.
...
An agitated, fearful schizophrenic may benefit from a
major tranquillizer such as trifluoperazine (Stelazine) or haloperidol (Haldol), while a deeply withdrawn or suicidal patient
may respond to an antidepressant such as amitriptyline (Elavil)
or imipramine (Tofranil) ....

Amphetamines or methylphen-

idate (Ritalin), which are classed as stimulant drugs, may par-
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adverse, and possibly irreversible, side effects.0 Because these
therapies powerfully influence both the mentation 7 and overt
behavior of a patient, their use may seriously jeopardize the
patient's autonomy, bodily integrity, and freedom of mentation.
In response to this problem, legal commentators have attempted to develop a theoretical framework for a constitutional
right to refuse treatment.8 The right to refuse the most intruadoxically suppress the extreme hyperactivity that afflicts some
young children.
Id. at 336 (footnotes omitted).
6. In the administration of electroconvulsive therapy, for example,
patients may suffer fractures and cardiovascular complications, although
both are rare. The most disturbing side effect now appears to be memory impairment, often temporary, but sometimes a "severe and permanent enough loss of memory to prevent resumption of previous vocations." Beresford, supra note 1, at 339 (footnotes omitted). The range
of possible side effects of drugs is much greater.
Implicit in every prescription of drugs is the risk of unexpected
side effects. The range of adverse reactions for most drugs is
so great that it is rare the physician indeed who can quote all
the reported side effects of a particular compound. These side
effects may include disturbances in mental function, mood or behavior and may raise the issue of whether the patient is becoming worse because of disease or because of treatment.
Id. at 337 (footnotes omitted).
Organic therapies may also be abused. State authorities, including
medical personnel, have been known to administer intrusive organic
therapies for improper purposes or in an improper manner. Knecht v.
Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (use in mental institution of apomorphine to induce lengthy seizures of vomiting as punishment for infractions of behavior protocols, such as talking, swearing, or lying is cruel
and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth amendment); Mackey
v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (prisoner stated valid civil
rights claim in alleging that the administration of succinycholine, a paralytic drug with frightening side effects, as part of an aversive treatment
program was cruel and unusual punishment; drug was administered to
fully conscious patients, although such use was not recommended);
Shapiro, supra note 4, at 245; ConditioningPrisonersand Mental Patients,
supra note 4, at 633-40. See generally Beresford, supra note 1, at 34455. These extreme examples of abuse have created public controversy
and may have been partially responsible for some legislative action. See
A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAw: A SysTEr iN TRANSITiON 98-99
(1975). Legislative regulations designed to minimize the risks to the patient associated with the responsible, legitimate administration of organic
therapies also will control their use for improper reasons.
7. Mentation refers to any mental functioning or activity, including
cognition, understanding, perception, volition, or emotion. Shapiro,
supra note 4, at 246 n.14.
8. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 1; Schwartz, supra note 4; Spoonhour, Psychosurgery and Informed Consent,26 U. FLA. L. REv. 432 (1974);
Symposium-Psychosurgery, 54 B.U.L. REv. 215 (1974); Note, Beyond the
"Cuckoo's Nest": A Proposal for Federal Regulation of Psychosurgery,
12 HARv. J. LEGis. 610 (1975); Note, Advances in Mental Health: A Case
for the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48 Tmw. L.Q. 354 (1975); Comment,
The Right Against Treatment: Behavior Modification and the Involun-
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tarily Committed, 23 CATH. U.L. REV.774 (1974); Comment, Kaimowitz v.
Dep't of Mental Health: Involuntary Mental Patient Cannot Give Informed Consent to Experimental Psychosurgery, 4 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 207 (1974); Comment, Informed Consent and the Mental Patient:
California Recognizes a Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Psychosurgery
and Shock Treatment, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 725 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Informed Consent and the Mental Patient].
A "qualified right to refuse" has been recognized by two courts,
which imposed procedures to regulate the administration of organic therapy. A federal court in Alabama has established minimum constitutional standards for the treatment of the mentally ill in state institutions.
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part,
remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Standard 9 of the district court's order
dealing with the right to refuse treatment was subsequently modified
to establish a procedure regulating the administration of adverse conditioning, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), or "any other extraordinary
or hazardous technique or procedure." Wyatt v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL DisABILITY L. REP. 55 (M.D. Ala. July 1, 1975).
See note 44 infra. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota has adopted a probate court procedure to
regulate the administration of psychosurgery and electroshock therapy,
although it declined to decide whether other therapies would also be
subject to such regulation. Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn.
1976).
Commentator interest in the right to refuse treatment grew out of
the "right to treatment" movement, which began in the early 1960's as
an attempt to provide constitutional protections to mental patients in
state institutions. See, e.g., Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the
Mentally Disabled: The Need for Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 513 (1973); Symposium-The Right to
Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 673 (1969); Symposium-The Mentally Ill and
the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHi. L. REv. 742 (1969); Note, The Rights
of the Mentally Ill During Incarceration: The Developing Law, 25 U.
FLA. L. Ray. 494 (1973); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA.
L. REv. 1134 (1967); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right
to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Civil Restraint].
Two federal appeals courts have recognized a constitutional right to
treatment. In Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521 (5th Cir. 1974),
remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the court accepted the
substantive due process argument developed in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part, remanded in part, decision
reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974), see note 44 infra, and concluded that deprivation of liberty for the
purpose of treatment is unjustified unless treatment is in fact provided.
Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974), held that the due process clause protects the right of juvenile
offenders to rehabilitative treatment. See also Welsch v. Likins, 373 F.
Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), which held that civilly committed mentally
retarded patients have a due process right to minimally adequate treatment designed to give them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to
improve their mental condition.
The Supreme Court, however, in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 576 (1975), was willing to hold only that "a state cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable
of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing
and responsible family members or friends." It declined to consider
"whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others have
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sive 9 therapies can be derived from the protection of an individual's autonomy and bodily integrity accorded by both the Bill of
Rights' ° and the developing right of privacy." The judiciary,
a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the State, or
whether the State may compulsorily confine a nondangerous mentally
ill individual for the purpose of treatment." Id. at 573.
9. The term "intrusive" is used to describe and characterize the
potential effect of a particular therapy on a patient.
The concept of intrusiveness of a therapy or program ... seems
to involve the following criteria (which, while in the main conceptually distinct, are in fact interdependent): (i) the extent
to which the effects of the therapy upon mentation are reversible; (ii) the extent to which the resulting psychic state is "foreign," "abnormal" or "unnatural" for the person in question,
rather than simply a restoration of his prior psychic state (this
is closely related to the '"magnitude" or "intensity" of the
change); (iii) the rapidity with which the effects occur; (iv)
the scope of the change in the total "ecology" of the mind's functions; (v) the extent to which one can resist acting in ways impelled by the psychic effects of the therapy; and (vi) the duration of the change.
Shapiro, supra note 4, at 262 (footnotes omitted). See Conditioning Prisoners and Mental Patients, supra note 4, at 619-21. While the criteria
noted above emphasize the impact a therapy will have on a patient's
mental processes, the concept of "intrusiveness" implicitly includes the
effect a therapy may have on a patient's "physical autonomy." See
Shapiro, supra note 4, at 258-69.
Were these criteria literally applied, every organic therapy, including
minor tranquilizers, could be classified as intrusive. The criteria,
however, are designed to aid in ranking therapies according to their degree of intrusiveness. As Friedman, supra note 1, at 90 noted:
Even guided by these criteria of intrusiveness, deciding which
treatments are more restrictive is largely a matter of subjective
opinion and theoretical disposition. But the idea that some techniques may be viewed as more onerous than others and that they
may be categorized may contribute to making the search for the
least restrictive alternative less difficult.
10. A number of commentators have argued that the Constitution's
implicit recognition of an individual's "autonomy, bodily integrity and
right to self-determination" requires protection of a mental patient's
right to refuse the most intrusive organic therapies. See, e.g., Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 820-22. These writers have focused on the substantive
protections provided by the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court, for example, has noted in dictum that "the overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment protects an individuars personal
integrity from arbitrary governmental interference). The due process
clause has been used to exclude evidence obtained through violations of
bodily integrity that "shock the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) (due process clause forbids policemen from pumping the
stomach of a suspected narcotics dealer seen to swallow two capsules).
Similarly, since an individual's right to free speech depends upon the
independent ability to generate ideas, the first amendment has been relied on to restrict the use of psychosurgery. Kaimowitz v. Department
of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW, (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich.,
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however, has either lacked the opportunity or been unwilling to
establish constitutional protection for the right of mental patients
to refuse treatment; only a few courts have done so. 12 Because
the law is undeveloped in this area, and because the regulation
of organic therapies raises a wide range of complex problems illsuited to judicial resolution, effective protection of mental pa13
tients' interests can best be accomplished by legislative action.
At least 13 states have adopted regulations governing the
administration of the most intrusive types of organic theraJuly 10,-1973), summarized at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (1973) and [1973] 13
CRiM. L. REP. (BNA) 2452
11. The constitutional right of privacy protects an individual's right

to make fundamental decisions concerning the conduct of his life,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Many commentators have recognized

that this right could also support a constitutional right to refuse treat-

ment. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 87 HARv.L. REV. 1190, 1194-95 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Civil Commitment]. Cf. Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn.
.1976).
12. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972),

aff'd in part, remanded in'part,decision reserved in part sub-nom. Wyatt
v.Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); note 44 infra; Kaimowitz v.
Department of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne

County, Mich., July 10, 1973), summarized at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (1973)
and [1973] 13 CamW. L. REP. (BNA) 2452. In Kaimowitz the court held
that experimental psychosurgery on an involuntarily confined mental
patient violated his first amendment right to generate ideas and his
constitutional right to privacy, and that the inherently coercive nature
of the institutional environment eliminated his ability to execute a voluntary, informed consent.
13. One court has designed a detailed procedure to regulate organic
therapies in order to protect patients' constitutional rights. See Wyatt
v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL DIsABiTy L. REP. 55 (M.D. Ala., July 1, 1975);
notes 44-52 infra and accompanying text. Even in this instance, however,
the complex mixture of controversial issues with which the court was
faced, the necessarily long and involved litigation, see note 44 infra, and
the case-by-case nature of the adjudicatory process limited the court's
effectiveness as a "regulatory" body. More important, courts may lack
the necessary information and expertise to produce satisfactory regulatory procedures. See Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1976),
in which the court established a probate court review of certain types
of treatments, but failed to delineate precisely when such review must
be sought, for which types of treatment, for which patients, and what
role consent would play in the decision to seek review or administer
treatment. But see Note, Reg-lation of Electroconvulsive Therapy, 75
icH. L. Rav. 363, 378, 395 (concluding that although Price is subject
to criticism, procedure would in "practical effect" determine patient's
competency and necessity of treatment).
In contrast, legislatures can design comprehensive regulatory systems with full consideration of the numerous issues that are necessarily
involved. Moreover, legislative protections can exceed 'minimum constitutional standards" and thus more effectively safeguard a broad range
of patient interests.
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pies.1 4 Most existing regulatory schemes seek to protect the
patient's interests by requiring his consent as a prerequisite to
the administration of those therapies the state has chosen to regulate. 5 State schemes differ significantly, however, in the particular procedural controls adopted and the extent to which they
implement the underlying principle of consent. This reflects
the complexity of designing such statutes, for legislatures must
balance the same intricate legal, psychological, medical, and
ethical considerations that complicate the administration of mental health care in general.
The design of any appropriate regulatory procedure, however, will ideally reflect several fundamental principles, 16 derived
from the same policies that underlie the constitutional arguments
for protecting a patient's right to refuse treatment.17 Since an
involuntary patient's presence in a mental health facility usually
results from an exercise of the state's parens patriae power, 1s 14. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.130(b) (1971) (consent required for surgery or "psychiatric therapies which the department determines"); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325 & 5326.2-.95 (West Supp. 1977) (patient

has a right to refuse convulsive treatment and psychosurgery); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-206d (West Cum. Supp. 1977) (no medical or surgical procedures including electroshock therapy may be performed without consent); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 23 (1972) (patient has
right to refuse shock treatment and lobotomy); Mic. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§ 330.1716 (West 1975) (consent required for surgery, electroconvulsive
therapy, or "another procedure intended to produce convulsions or
coma"); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 15.03(b) (4) (McKinney Supp. 1976)
(consent required for "surgery, shock treatment, major medical treatment in the nature of surgery, or the use of experimental drugs or procedures"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-55.6 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (informed consent required for "electroshock therapy, the use of experimental drugs
or procedures, or surgery, other than emergency surgery"); Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 5123.86 (Page Supp. 1975) (informed consent required for
surgery, convulsive therapy, aversion therapy, sterilization, experimental
procedures, any unusual or hazardous treatment or procedures); TENN.
CODE ANx. § 33-307 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (consent must be obtained prior
to surgery); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7708 (1968) (consent required for
surgery); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.370(7), (9) (1975) (involuntarily detained patient has right to refuse shock treatment and nonemergency surgery). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 88-502.3 (a) (1971) (written
consent required before therapy "which is not recognized as standard
psychiatric treatment" may be given); IDAHo CODE § 66-346 (a) (4) (Cum.
Supp. 1975) (right "[t]o refuse specific modes of treatment").
15. Civil Commitment, supra note 11, at 1347.
16. See § 1 of the Model Statute developed in this Note; notes 2527 infra and accompanying text.
17. See sources cited in note 8 supra; Civil Commitment, supra
note 11 (discussing a number of considerations that affect the design
of both commitment and treatment regulations).
18. The sweep of the state's power under the parens patriae doctrine has traditionally been very broad.

-
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a regulatory scheme should recognize the state's power and
obligation under that doctrine to provide patients with the
most effective and appropriate treatment possible. When the
state acts as a substitute decisionmaker for incompetent patients
who are unable to decide for themselves, it has a responsibility to
check the treating physician's exercise of discretion in prescribing therapy 19 to ensure that the patient's best interests are
served. Because of the structure of present commitment laws,
however, some patients within mental health institutions may be
competent to make treatment decisions for themselves; 20 such
[The] parens patriae jurisdiction is a right of a sovereignty and
imposes a duty on the sovereignty to protect the public interest.
[This power and duty] ... extends to the personal liberty of
persons who are under a disability whether by reason of infancy,
incompetency, habitual drunkenness, imbecility, etc. Its exercise can be spelled out of the many statutory provisions relating
to the settlement, incarceration, care, and support of such persons by the State. This jurisdiction and duty is called into play
when it is found that such persons could be a danger to themselves or to the public if they were not taken and held under
the protective custody of the sovereign.
Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 428, 114 A.2d 1, 5 (1955).
"Courts and legislatures ... have generally assumed that the parens
patriae power justifies the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill
for care and treatment or protection from harm." Civil Commitment,
supra note 11, at 1209-10. "When civil commitment is used to vindicate
a societal interest rather than to further the interest of the mentally ill
individual, it constitutes an exercise of the police power." Id. at 1222.
Regardless of the justification for an individual's confinement, however,
the same limiting principles should apply to the state's unconsented administration of therapy.
Given the long standing hesitancy of society to interfere with
a physically ill person's treatment decisions, and the questionable nature of the state's police power interest in compelling a
competent individual to act solely for his own welfare, commitment for treatment should be restricted to actions under the
parens patriae power and a competent individual's refusal to
seek treatment should be considered "strictly a private concern
and thus beyond the reach of all governmental power."
Id. at 1228 (footnotes omitted). Finally, for those mentally ill individuals confined under the state's police power because they present a danger to society, no therapy should be involuntarily administered since the
state can accomplish its goal through the less restrictive alternative of
simple confinement. Id. at 1232.
19. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw, supra note 2, at 164. See
STONE,, supra note 6, at 97-106; cf. Goldiamond, Singling Out Behavior
Modification For Legal Regulation: Some Effects on Patient Care, Psychotherapy, and Research in General, 17 Am. L. REV. 105, 119 (1975)
(implicitly accepts premise that regulation of the treatment prescription
is appropriate; regulation should be based on a complete examination
of all the relevant data).
20. Many individuals who are presently committed as mentally ill
either retain or regain the capacity to make rational decisions about the
conduct'of their lives, including decisions regarding organic treatments.
See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 4, at 308; Civil Commitment, supra note
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patients should have a right to refuse the imposition of certain
therapies.
Finally, because only the more intrusive organic therapies
will seriously jeopardize the patient's best interests, regulating all
such therapies may be unnecessary. 21 There are practical limitations on the state's ability to regulate, for control of all
therapies would produce tremendous administrative complexity
and severely tax the state's financial resources. 22 Within
the extremes of an absolute right for all patients to refuse all
organic therapies 23 and complete deferral to the treating physician's judgment, then, a regulatory scheme must determine
11, at 1212-16, 1350; cf. Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1553-56
(1975) (several considerations suggest that an unacceptably high number
of people are presently being committed who should not be). In Minnesota, for example, commitment is not an adjudication of legal incompetency. MNN.STAT. 253A.18 (1) (1976).

The statutory standards for ju-

dicial commitment require that the proposed patient be mentally ill,
that the evidence of [his] conduct clearly shows [both] that his
customary self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct
of his affairs and social relations is lessened to such an extent
that hospitalization is necessary for his own welfare or the protection of society; [and] . ..

(i)that he has attempted to or

threatened to take his own life or attempted to seriously physically harm himself or others; or (ii) that he has failed to protect himself from exploitation from others; or (iii) that he has
failed to care for his own needs for food, clothing, shelter, safety
or medical care....
Id. § 253A.07(17) (a). None of these standards would necessarily require a committing court to determine that a patient lacks the capacity
to make a treatment decision, although a commitment based on the third
standard could encompass such a finding. See note 125 infra.
21. "[A]ccepted, nonexperimental or less intrusive therapies" require little or no regulation. See STONE, supra note 6, at 97. The intrusiveness criteria, see note 9 supra, will assist a legislature or administrative board to rank therapies according to their degree of intrusiveness.
Once ranked, the therapies must be placed in a regulated or nonregulated category, a task that requires close consideration of a number of
legal, ethical, moral, and pragmatic concerns. Choosing which therapies
to regulate may also require consideration of the constitutional right to
refuse doctrine, see Shapiro, supra note 4, at 245.
22. See note 82 infra and accompanying text.
23.

STONE supra note 6, at 102. An absolute right to refuse every

form of treatment would be inconsistent with the state's parens patriae
power. Under that doctrine, a state can confine an incompetent individual in order to provide treatment. See note 18 supra. Even a patient's
presence within a hospital is a form of treatment known as milieu therapy. Conditioning Prisoners and Mental Patients,supra note 4, at 621.
An absolute right to refuse every form of therapy, then, would eliminate
all involuntary commitments except those that could be justified under
the state's police power. The Model Statute developed in this Note eliminates this conflict by giving patients a right to refuse only regulated
therapies. See note 24 infra; but see note 125 infra.
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which therapies will be regulated and which patients will have
24
the right to refuse regulated therapies.
Although the appropriateness of regulating organic therapies may fairly be debated, the activties of state legislatures
in this area indicate a growing acceptance of such regulations.
In order to provide a guide for future legislative action, this
Note will develop a Model Statute incorporating the described
fundamental principles underlying an appropriate regulatory
scheme. The Model Statute is grounded on the principle that
the informed treatment decision of an individual with the capacity to make it should be determinative. 25 In order to implement
this principle, the statute utilizes a competency hearing to determine capacity. 2 6

For an incompetent patient, 27 who lacks this

24. This Note will use the term "regulated therapy" to refer to an
organic therapy that the legislature has chosen to regulate. Therapies
could be regulated in a number of ways. If the legislature determined
that the risk posed by an organic therapy outweighed any potential benefit a patient might receive, the therapy could be banned altogether. See,
e.g., Wyatt v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL

DISABILITY

L. REP. 55, 56 (M.D. Ala.

July 1, 1975) (no lobotomy, psychosurgery, or other unusual, hazardous,
or intrusive surgical procedure may be performed on any patient). All
members of a specified group could be precluded from receiving a particular therapy. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. &

INST. CODE

§ 5326.8 (West Supp.

1977) (no convulsive treatment performed on a patient under 12 years
of age). Alternatively, the legislature could define the group of regulated therapies and provide that a patient's treatment decision will
be determinative only under specified circumstances. See, e.g., WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.370(7), (9) (1975). The majority of existing
procedures, however, establishes the consent of the proposed patient as a
prerequisite to the administration of a regulated therapy, see notes 1415 supra. This more flexible approach has been chosen for the Model
Statute developed in this Note.
25. See THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 164,
172. For a definition of capacity to make an informed treatment decision,
see Model Statute § 2(e).
Predicating treatment on a competent patient's consent should avoid
any potential constitutional problem, for consent may be deemed a
waiver of any constitutional right to refuse. See Civil Commitment,
supra note 11, at 1352. The Model Statute's use of the concept of "consent to treatment" also conforms to the requirement of common lawa valid consent must be competent, voluntary, and knowing. "To be
effective, consent must be (a) by one who has the capacity to consent,
or by a person empowered to consent for him, and (b) to the particular
conduct, or to substantially the same conduct .... Consent is not effective if it is given under duress." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS §§
892A(2), 892B(3) (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
Finally, since patients being treated for physical illness ordinarily
must consent to treatment, requiring competent mental patients' consent
preserves their right to equal protection. See Civil Commitment, supra
note 11, at 1228-31.
26. The Model Statute adopts procedural protections for the competency hearing similar to the due process safeguards adopted by many
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capacity, the statute establishes a third party decisionmaker
to determine whether the administration of the proposed regulated therapy would serve the patient's best interests.
In order to familiarize the reader with this method of
regulation, several examples of existing procedures will be examined to determine whether particular components are consistent
with the underlying principles of the Model Statute. In addition, the manner in which these schemes deal with collateral
issues, including the role of a patient's legal or natural guardian
and the protection afforded the patient's due process rights, will
be assessed. Conclusions drawn from this analysis will then
serve as a framework for the development of a Model Statute
28
to regulate the administration of organic therapies.
courts for judicial commitment proceedings. The following procedural
safeguards have been accorded constitutional status in the context of
commitment proceedings:
(A) adequate prior notice, Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp.
1113, 1127 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388
(M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473, aff'd on other grounds, 379
F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957, afid on other
grounds, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1975); Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 124
(W. Va. 1974);
(B) the right to be present at the commitment hearing and to participate therein, Suzuki v. Quisenberry, supra at 1129; Lynch v. Baxley,
supra at 388-89; Lessard v. Schmidt, supra at 1091; see also' Bell v.
Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1094 (E.D. Mich. 1974);
(C) the right to effective assistance of counsel, Heryford v. Parker,
396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, supra at 1129;
Lynch v. Baxley, supra at 389; Lessard v. Schmidt, supra at 1092; Dixon
v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971);
(D) the right to cross-examine witnesses and to offer evidence,
Suzuki v. Quisenberry, supra at 1130; Lynch v. Baxley, supra at 394;
(E) adherence to the rules of evidence, Suzuki v. Quisenberry,
supra at 1130;
(F) proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520
F.2d 931, 935-37 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976); In re
Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, supra
at 1132; Lessard v. Schmidt, supra at 1095; Lausche v. Commissioner of
Pub. Welfare, 302 Minn. 65, 69, 225 N.W.2d 366, 369, cert. denied, 420
U.S. 993 (1974);
(G) a record of the proceedings and written findings of fact, Suzuki v. Quisenberry, supra at 1133; Lynch v. Baxley, supra at 396.
27. For the definition of competency used in the Model Statute, see
Model Statute § 2(e); see also text accompanying notes 120-21 infra.
28. State regulations of the initial commitment process and of the
treatment decisions of committed patients are conceptually interrelated.
Discussion of the commitment process itself is beyond the scope of this
Note, but the logic underlying the Model Statute's regulation of treatment decisions would support certain analogous adjustments in commitment proceedings. See note 125 infra.
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EXISTING REGULATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION
OF INTRUSIVE ORGANIC THERAPIES
THE MICHIGAN PROCEDURE

The Michigan statute regulating organic therapy is similar to
the procedures adopted in a number of other states. 29 Consent
is a prerequisite to the administration of surgery or convulsive
therapy, and the statute lists the individuals who are eligible to
89

provide consent.

(1) Except as provided in subsections (2)31 and (3),32 a recipient of mental health services shall not have surgery performed upon him, nor shall he be the subject of electro-convulsive therapy or of another procedure intended to produce
convulsions or coma, unless consent is obtained from:
(a) The recipient if he is 18 years of age or over and competent to consent.
(b) The guardian of the recipient 3if8 the guardian is legally empowered to execute such a consent.
(c) The parent of the recipient if the recipient is less than 18
years of age.

If none of these individuals can be found, a probate court may

34
approve the administration of one of the regulated therapies.

The Michigan statute protects the interests of both competent and incompetent patients by explicitly distinguishing be29. See note 14 supra. For a general discussion and critique of the
Michigan regulatory procedure, see Morris, Institutionalizingthe Rights
of Mental Patients: Committing the Legislature, 62 CALIF. L. Rzv. 957,
992 (1974).
30. MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1716(1) (West 1975).
31. Subsection (2) of the Michigan regulatory procedure is an
emergency exception.
If the life of a recipient is threatened and there is not time to
obtain consent, the procedures listed in subsection (1) may be
performed without consent after the medical necessity for the
procedure has been documented and the documentation has been
entered into the record of the recipient.
Id. § 330.1716 (2).
32. Subsection (3) of the Michigan regulatory procedure provides:
If one of the procedures listed in subsection (1) is deemed advisable for a recipient, and if no one eligible under subsection
(1) to give consent can be found after diligent effort, a probate
court may, upon petition and after hearing, consent to performance of the procedure in lieu of the person eligible to give consent.
Id. § 330.1716 (3).
33. The statute does not define this phrase, but it has been
clarified by an administrative rule that defined "guardian" as a "person
empowered to execute a consent pursuant to a probate court order,"
M CH. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH CODE EMERGENcY RULES

330.7001(f) (1975). See 9 MICH. J.L. REF. 620, 637 (1976).
34. See note 32 supra.
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tween them and by making the treatment decision of a competent patient determinative. 5 Nevertheless, the statute fails to
define what constitutes "competency," to provide for an initial
competency hearing to make that determination,3 6 or to provide
due process safeguards when the probate court's jurisdiction is
invoked.3 7 Moreover, the statutory criterion guiding the probate court's determination of whether a treatment should be
approved is extremely vague: the court may allow treatment if
it is "deemed advisable. '3 , The Michigan procedure, therefore,
inadequately implements the principle of competent consent
and inadequately protects the incompetent patient.
In its recognition of the possible existence of both a legal
and a natural guardian and its attempt to define their roles, the
Michigan statute is clearly superior to the majority of existing
regulations, which tend to ignore these issues.39 Allowing the
patient's legal guardian to make a treatment decision for an
incompetent patient, 40 however, may give him too much responsibility since he will usually lack both the legal and medical
expertise necessary to evaluate whether the patient's legal rights
have been violated or whether a proposed therapy is in the
patient's best interest. Similarly, the assumption that a parent 41
or legal guardian will automatically act in the best interests of the
ward when contemplating a treatment decision may not be
justified. 42 Yet the Michigan statute provides no way to pre35. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
36. Since the statute does not provide for a competency hearing,
presumably a doctor could proceed with treatment upon the consent of
a patient he deemed "competent." If a patient were deemed incompetent
by the physician, and no one eligible to consent could be found, the doctor would be obligated to invoke the jurisdiction of the probate court.
At that point, the court might hold some type of competency hearing,
but such a procedure is not specified in the statute. If the probate court
merely accepted the certification of the treating physician as sufficient
to establish the patient's incompetency, however, there would be no
check on the physician's judgment. See note 19 supra and accompanying
text.
37. The probate court might, on its own motion, provide the patient
with certain due process rights, see note 26 supra; nevertheless, the legislature's oversight complicates the court's task.
38. See note 32 supra.
39. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL DsAiL~riTy L. REP. 56
(M.D. Ala. July 1, 1975); WAsu. Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.370(7), (9)
(1975).
40. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 330.1716 (1) (b) (West 1975).
41. Under the Michigan procedure, a parent is empowered to consent or withhold consent for the child's treatment. Id. § 330.1716 (1) (c).
42. The validity of the assumption that a parent is the best repre-
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vent a guardian from consenting to an inappropriate or dangerous
therapy or refusing to consent to a potentially beneficial one 3
B.

THE ALABAMA PROCEDURE

A federal court sitting in Alabama has developed regulations to implement what it established as the "minimum consti'44
tutional standards for adequate treatment of the mentally ill."
sentative of a child's rights has recently been questioned. See Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CA=F. L. REV. 840 (1974); Spoonhour, supra note 8, at 438-39.
43. A guardian may act in bad faith; but equally or more dangerous is the possibility than an irrational decision of a parent or guardian
acting in good faith will jeopardize the best interests of the ward. See
Goldiamond, supra note 19, at 114.
44. In Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. -Supp. 373, 379, 344 F. Supp. 387,
395 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D.

Ala. 1971), aff'd in part, remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), the court ruled
that mentally impaired persons confined in Alabama state hospitals were
being denied their constitutional "right to treatment" and ordered numerous institutional changes in three state hospitals.
The Wyatt decision has a long and complicated procedural history.
The original suit was brought as a class action by the guardians of patients confined to Bryce Hospital in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. 325 F. Supp.
781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The district court held that each patient who had
been involuntarily committed in civil proceedings had a constitutional
right to receive treatment that would cure or improve his mental
condition. Id. at 784. The plaintiffs were then granted permission to
enlarge their class to include patients involuntarily confined for mental
treatment at Searcy Hospital, Mount Vernon, Alabama, and those individuals in Partlow State School and Hospital for the mentally retarded
in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. 334 F. Supp. at 1342 n.l.
In the original action, the district court gave the defendants six
months to implement a treatment program that would safeguard the
patients' right to treatment. When the defendants failed to institute a program satisfying minimum medical and constitutional requisites
within the specified time, the district court set a hearing date to receive
evidence on 'the appropriate standards to protect the patients' constitutional right to treatment. Id. at 1344. After receiving evidence from
"the foremost authorities on mental health in the United States," the
district court established minimum constitutional standards for adequate
treatment of the mentally ill in the Bryce and Searcy facilities. 344 F.
Supp. at 379-86. In an accompanying opinion, the court ordered the
implementation of similar standards for adequate habilitation of the
mentally retarded at Partlow State School and Hospital. Id. at 387.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
the constitution guaranteed a right to treatment to civilly committed
mental patients; that the suit was not barred by the eleventh amendment; that the right to treatment could be implemented through judicially manageable standards; and that granting relief did not infringe
on legislative prerogatives. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312-16
(5th Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit reserved decision on whether the district court could alter the state budget or take other steps to finance the
right to treatment should the state fail to take appropriate action on
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Among them is an administrative procedure to govern adverse
conditioning programs, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), and
other extraordinary or hazardous techniques. 45 The cornerstone
of this regulatory system is a five member Extraordinary Treatment Committee 46 that oversees the use of regulated therapies.
Before ECT4 7 can be administered to a patient, two Qualified Mental Health Professionals 4 must independently recommend its use, and their recommendations must be approved by
the ground that the issue was premature. Id. at 1317-18. A decision
on the award of attorney's fees was also reserved. Id. at 1319. See generally Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree
OrderingInstitutionalChanges, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
45. The original standard was: "Patients have a right not to be
subjected to treatment procedures such as lobotomy, electro-convulsive
treatment, aversive reinforcement conditioning or other unusual or hazardous treatment procedures without their express and informed consent
after consultation with counsel or interested party of the patient's
choice." Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 380 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd
in part, remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). In Wyatt v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL
DIsAmriar L. REP. 55 (M.D. Ala. July 1, 1975), this single "standard"
was expanded to an entire set of procedural regulations under the following rationale:
[I]n setting forth the minimum constitutional requirements for
the employment of certain extraordinary or potentially hazardous modes of treatment, the Court is not undertaking to deter-

mine which forms of treatment are appropriate in particular situations. Such a diagnostic decision is a medical judgment and
is not within the province, jurisdiction or expertise of this Court.
But the determination of what procedural safeguards must accompany the use of extraordinary or potentially hazardous
modes of treatment on patients in the state's mental institutions
is a fundamentally legal question and one which the parties to
this lawsuit have put at issue.
Id. at 55-56.
46. For the composition of the Extraordinary Treatment Board, see
note 88 infra.
47. This discussion focuses only on the regulation of ECT. Under
the regulatory scheme, psychosurgery is forbidden, Wyatt v. Hardin, 1
MENTAL DisAmrr
L. REP. 55, 56 (M.D. Ala. July 1, 1975), and the procedures promulgated for aversive conditioning and "other unusual or
hazardous treatment procedures" generally conform to those for ECT.
Id. at 56-57.
48. The court defined "Qualified Mental Health Professional" as:
(1) a psychiatrist with three years of residency training in psychiatry;
(2) a psychologist with a doctoral degree from an accredited
program;
(3) a social worker with a master's degree from an accredited
program and two years of clinical experience under the supervision of a Qualified Mental Health Professional;
(4) a registered nurse with a graduate degree in psychiatric
nursing and two years of clinical experience under the supervision of a Qualified Mental Health Professional.
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part,
remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F,2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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the superintendent or medical director of the hospital.
After
the proposed patient executes a written consent, the Extraordinary Treatment Committee must "determine, after appropriate
inquiry and interviews with the patient, whether [his] consent
...is, in fact, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and whether
the proposed treatment is the least drastic alternative available
for the treatment of his illness. '' 4 9 Only if the Treatment
Committee answers both these questions affirmatively can the
treatment be administered.5 0 The refusal of a competent patient
is determinative; but if "the patient is deemed incompetent ...
by either his attorney, the treating psychiatrist or the Extraordinary Treatment Committee, the Committee may consent to such
treatment on his behalf if it determines that the evidence presented to it clearly indicates .. . that [it] is in the patient's best
interest." 51 In reaching its decision, the Committee must "give
great weight to any expression by the patient of a desire not to
be subjected to ECT. Any doubts that ECT is in the best
interest of the incompetent patient shall be resolved against
proceeding with such treatment. '52
A key deficiency of the Alabama procedure is its relative
inflexibility. Although there are occasions when it might be
medically appropriate to administer ECT to a patient under
18 years of age, 53 for example, no such patient can ever receive ECT 54 even if he can make an informed treatment deci49. Wyatt v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL DIsABILrrY L. REP. 55, 56 (M.D. Ala.
July 1, 1975).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 56-57. The Alabama procedure lists several factors on
which this best interest determination should rest, which have been incorporated into the Model Statute. See Model Statute § 12(c).
52. 1 MENTAL DisABILITY L. REP. at 57.
53. See L. KALiNowsKY & H. Hippius, PHARIOCOLOGICAL CONVULIN PsYcHIATRY 222-23 (1969); E.
CONTROL 158-62 (1973); Schwartz, supra note 4, at

SIVE AND OTHER SOMATIc TREATMENTS

VALENSTEiN, BRAIN

813-14. Compare the California regulatory procedure's treatment of
this issue.
Under no circumstances shall convulsive treatment be performed
on a minor under 12 years of age. Persons 16 and 17 years of
age shall personally have and exercise the rights of this article.
Persons 12 years of age and over, and under 16, may be administered convulsive treatment only if all the other provisions of
this law are complied with and in addition:
(a) It is an emergency situation ....
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.8 (West Supp. 1977). The Alabama procedure does not contain a provision allowing a treating physician to circumvent the ordinary procedure in an emergency situation. See Model
Statute § 15.
54. 1 M TrrALDisABiLrry L. REP. at 57.
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sion. This procedural prohibition limits the right of competent minor patients to control their treatment and prevents all
such patients from receiving a potentially beneficial therapy. 55
Another disturbing aspect of the Alabama administrative
procedure is the ease with which a patient can be declared incompetent by his attorney or the treating psychiatrist. 56 Under a
literal interpretation of the court order, once either of these
parties so specifies, a patient is considered incompetent for purposes of the regulatory procedure. Rather than conducting a
competency hearing, 57 the Committee investigates only whether
the proposed therapy is in the patient's best interest. Although
the court had previously held that a patient's right to refuse the
administration of some organic therapies was a minimum constitutional standard for adequate treatment of the mentally ill,58 and
made the patient's competency the determining factor in the
regulation of organic therapy, this protection is seriously diminished if the question of competency can so easily be eliminated. 59
55. This restriction might be unconstitutional under Aden v.
Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Ct. App. 1976). In
response to a challenge by voluntary patients to a regulation that precluded them from receiving potentially beneficial therapy, the Aden
court declared the California administrative procedure unconstitutional.
See note 60 infra. Whether a competent, consenting minor should be
allowed to receive ECT presents a more difficult question, especially if
the legal or natural guardian has also consented. If a court were willing
to extend the Aden holding to involuntarily committed but competent
patients, the same theory might apply. The total ban on psychosurgery
under the Alabama procedure, Wyatt v. Hardin, 1

MENTAL

DisABmiTy L.

55, 56 (M.D. Ala. July 1, 1975), might be challenged on the same
theory.
56. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
57. In the course of determining the patient's "best interests," the
court might of course review the question of competency, but that is not
required. The Model Statute cures this defect by requiring the Board
to determine a patient's competency in each case. See Model Statute
§§ 5, 9.
58. See note 45 supra.
59. The Alabama procedure does require that "great weight" be
given the desires of the patient, see text accompanying note 52 supra;
theoretically, this could afford some protection for a competent patient
erroneously classified as incompetent. A literal interpretation of the regulation, however, requires the committee to give "great weight" to the
wishes of any patient, competent or incompetent. Because giving great
weight to the wishes of an obviously incompetent patient appears to
make little sense, the intended effect of the provision is unclear, and
the committee might tend to discount it. Thus, in practice, it would
do very little to protect the rights of misclassified competent patients.
Compare Model Statute § 13 and accompanying commentary.
REP.
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C. THE CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE
The current California statute"0 represents one of the most
sophisticated and complete regulatory procedures enacted in any
state. It is commendable in many respects, but some aspects of
the law prevent full implementation of the underlying principle
of consent.
The California procedure regulates only psychosurgery 6 '
and convulsive treatment,62 with separate prerequisites for the
administration of each. The provisions governing psychosurgery
illustrate some of the advantages and deficiencies of the regulatory scheme.6 3 Only patients with the capacity 64 to execute a
"written informed consent," 65 and who have done so, are al60.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325, 5326.2-.95

(West Supp. 1977).

The former California regulatory procedure for psychosurgery and
shock treatment, 1974 Cal. Stats., ch. 1534, §§ 1-5, as amended, CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325, 5326.3-.5 (West Supp. 1977), was recently

declared unconstitutional. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129
Cal. Rptr. 535 (Ct. App. 1976). In Aden, treating physicians and mental patients asked the court to declare unconstitutional the state's regulation requiring administrative review of treatment recommendations
for psychosurgery and ECT for all patients. Under the then existing
California statute, before either therapy could be administered, a committee of physicians had to unanimously confirm that the consenting
patient had the capacity to give informed consent and that the treating
physician's substantive determinations were correct. 1974 Cal. Stats.,
ch. 1534, §§ 3-4, as amended, CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE §§ 5326.3-.4 (West
Supp. 1977). The court found this substitute decisionmaking process
constitutional for all involuntary patients. For voluntary competent
patients, however, review of the substantive accuracy of the treating
physician's prescription was constitutional for psychosurgery, but not
for ECT. 57 Cal. App. at 682-84, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548-49.
61. For a definition of psychosurgery used in the California procedure, see the Model Statute § 2(c) (1).
62. The term "convulsive treatment" includes, but is not limited to,
"any electroconvulsive treatment, any treatment of the mental condition
which depends on the induction of a convulsion by any means, and insulin coma treatment." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325 (f) (West Supp.
1977).
63. The convulsive therapy regulations for both voluntary and involuntary patients have similar advantages and deficiencies. See note 70
infra.

64. The California regulatory procedure defines the capacity to give
informed consent by negative implication: "A person confined shall be
deemed incapable of written informed consent if such person cannot
understand, or knowingly and intelligently act upon, the information
specified in Section 5326.2." CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 5326.5(c) (West
Supp. 1977).
65. "For purposes of this chapter, 'written informed consent'
means that a person knowingly and intelligently, without duress or coercion, clearly and explicitly manifests consent to the proposed therapy
to the treating physician and in writing on the standard consent form
prescribed in Section 5326.4." Id. § 5326.5 (a).
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lowed to receive psychosurgery. No distinction is made between
voluntary and involuntary patients. Before a consenting competent patient can receive psychosurgery, the treating physician
must enter a signed statement in the patient's treatment record,
outlining the reasons for prescribing psychosurgery and recording the treating physician's opinion that all other appropriate
modes of treatment have been exhausted. The entry must also
state that psychosurgery, as a mode of treatment, is definitely
indicated and is the least drastic alternative available for the
treatment of the patient at that time.86
A three member board reviews recommendations for psychosurgery. 67 The review board is composed of three physicians,0 8 one appointed by the treating institution and two appointed by the local mental health director. Before a patient
can receive psychosurgery, this board must unanimously agree
that the treating physician's determinations in the patient's treatment record are substantively accurate, and that the patient has
the capacity to give informed consent.6 9 There is no provision,
however, for a hearing on these issues. ri making their decision
the board members are required to examine the patient and to
review the treatment record30
Another section of the regulation outlines what information must be
given to the patient in a "clear and explicit" manner in order to constitute "voluntary informed consent." Id. § 5326.2. Compare Model Statute § 7(b). The California Department of Mental Health is required
to promulgate a standard written consent form which contains the information generally appropriate to all patients. CAL. WELF. & INsT.
CODE § 5326.3 (West Supp. 1977). In seeking the written consent of

prospective patients, the treating physician is required to use this standard consent form and supplement it in writing with the information
which pertains particularly to the patient being treated. Id.
66. Id. § 5326.6(c).
67. Id. § 5326.6 (d).
68. Two of the physicians must be either board-certified or eligible
psychiatrists or neurosurgeons. All three physicians personally must
examine the proposed patient. Id.
69. The board's agreement must be documented in the patient's
treatment record and signed by each board member. Id.
70. Id. The convulsive therapy provisions establish separate prerequisites for the administration of such therapy to voluntary and involuntary patients. Compare id. § 53.26.7 with § 5326.75. For involuntary
patients, including a patient under guardianship or conservatorship, the
treating physician must enter a signed statement in the patient's treatment record documenting the reasons for administering the treatment.
This statement must also include the treating physician's opinion that
all reasonable modes of treatment have been carefully considered, that
the proposed treatment is definitely indicated, and that the prescribed
convulsive treatment is the least drastic alternative available for the
proposed patient at that time. Id. § 5326.7(a).
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One of the deficiencies in the California procedure is its
failure to insulate the review boards from both the mental health
The statute does specify that
system and treating physicians."
be
personally involved with the
not
should
members
the board
72
case they are reviewing;
whose
patient
the
of
treatment
but because the members are appointed by personnel in the
mental health care system, there is some risk that their decisions
will be improperly influenced. Even if such influence may be
A review board verifies the substantive accuracy of the treating physician's prescription of convulsive treatments. Id. § 5326.7(b). The review is composed of two physicians, both of whom must be either boardcertified or board-eligible psychiatrists or neurologists; one is appointed
by the treating institution and one by the local mental health director.
Id.

As a prerequisite to the administration of a convulsive therapy, both
board members must agree with the treating physician's determinations
in the patient's treatment record. At least one of the board members
must personally examine the patient. The board's agreement must be
documented in the patient's treatment record and signed by each board
member. Id.
The patient must also execute a written informed consent before
receiving convulsive treatment. See note-65 supra. An involuntary patient's capacity to consent and that he has in fact consented must be verified by the patient's attorney. If the proposed patient does not have
his own attorney, a public defender is appointed by the court. Id.
§ 5326.7 (e). If either the attending physician or the patient's attorney
believes that an involuntary patient.does not have this capacity, a superior court must determine the issue. Id. §'5326.7(f). Upon receipt
of the appropriate petition, and after giving, notice to the patient, the
court must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the patient must be
present and represented by counsel. If the patient's attorney who
brought the petition is deemed to have "a conflict of interest, such attorney shall not represent the patient in this proceeding." Id. If the court
determines that the patient does not have the capacity to give a written
informed consent, see note 65 supra, the proposed therapy may be
administered if consent is obtained from a responsible relative, id. §
5326.6(b), or guardian or conservator of the patient. Id. § 5326.7(g).
When treatment has been prescribed for a voluntary patient, the
statute requires the treating physician to make the same determinations
that are made for involuntary patients. Id. § 5326.75(a). The proposed
patient must also execute a written informed consent. See note 65
supra. If a board-certified or board-eligible psychiatrist or neurologist,
id. § 5326.75 (b), other than the patient's attending or treating physician,
examines the voluntary patient and verifies that the patient has capacity
to give consent and has done so, neither the review board nor the court
need be consulted. Id. § 5326.75. If no verification is obtained, or if
the proposed voluntary patient does not have the capacity to give an
informed consent, however, then the procedures followed for involuntary
patients apply. Id. § 5326.75 (c).
71. As noted previously, the board members are appointed either
by the local mental health director or the treating facility. See text
accompanying note 68 supra.
72.

CAL. WELF. & INST.

CODE §

5326.55 (West Supp. 1977).
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unlikely, eliminating the mere appearance of "bias" would
strengthen confidence in the board's procedures.
The entire design of the California procedure attests to the
legislature's determination that the written informed consent of a
competent patient be a prerequisite to the administration of
psychosurgery. Nevertheless, the procedure pertaining to psychosurgery requires only a review of capacity, not of whether
informed consent was actually given.7 3 This failure to require
that the execution of informed consent be verified undermines
the utility of making the threshold determination that the patient
has capacity.

74

Another deficiency of the California law is that the psychosurgery provisions do not require a hearing by the board when it
reviews the treatment recommendation and the patient's capacity
to consent. The patient's due process rights may thus be jeopardized, 75 for the statute provides no forum in which a patient's
attorney, guardian, or conservator could challenge the board's
determination that the patient has capacity. 76 Moreover, a
treating physician, knowing that only competent patients are
allowed to receive psychosurgery, is unlikely to petition the board
for treatment of a patient he deems incompetent. As a result,
some competent patients may be improperly denied treatment,
73. Compare id. § 5326.6(d) with § 5326.7 (e) - (g) and § 5326.75(b).
74. Similarly, for involuntary patients recommended for convulsive
therapy, the determination of whether informed consent was given is
left to the patient's attorney in those instances in which the attorney
believes the patient has capacity. Id. § 5326.7 (e). In those instances in
which the competency decision is left to the superior court, see note 70
supra, there is apparently no verification of whether informed consent
was actually given.

CAL.

WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7 (g)

(West Supp.

1977). This conclusion is based on the fact that there is no provision
for determining whether or not a responsible relative, guardian, or conservator has in fact given a written informed consent. In addition, if
the court determines that a patient does have the capacity to give an
informed consent, it is not clear that the issue of whether such consent
was actually given will ever be considered before treatment is commenced.
75. In Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Ct.
App. 1976), the court held that the previous California regulatory procedure did not meet the requirements of procedural due process since
its provisions for a hearing on the issues of competency and voluntariness
were inadequate. See note 60 supra. On the basis of this precedent the
new California regulations are also defective. The only explicit provision for a hearing applies to convulsive treatment and is intended to
evaluate only the capacity of an involuntary patient to give informed
consent. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7 (f) (West Supp. 1977).
76. See also Model Statute § 10 and accompanying commentary.
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for they have no method under the statute to challenge the
7
physician's determination. "
III.

A MODEL STATUTE GOVERNING THE

ADMINISTRATION OF ORGANIC THERAPY

A.

INTRODUCTION

As the overview of the procedures used in Michigan, Alabama, and California suggests, designing an effective regulatory
scheme governing the use of organic therapies requires that
many factors be taken into account and many competing interests be accommodated. The Model Statute developed in
78
this Note is intended to assist state legislatures in that task.
70
Although the statute could be enacted virtually as written,
it is also intended as a general guide, directing attention to
issues that have received inadequate treatment in the past.
Thus, in some instances, the statute offers alternative approaches to a specific problem, and the Commentary delineates
the different considerations that would influence a legislature -to
adopt one approach or another. In other instances deemed
essential to the effective functioning of the regulatory procedure,
77. A similar criticism applies to the procedure for regulating convulsive treatment of involuntary patients. A hearing on the question
of capacity is held only if the patient's attorney or the treating physician believes capacity is lacking. See note 70 supra. A patient deemed
able to consent by both of these parties therefore is not entitled to
a formal determination of his capacity.
78. Some of the key features of the proposed statute have been
adapted from the regulatory scheme developed by the court in Wyatt
v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL DIsABuITY L. REP. 55 (M.D. Ala, July 1, 1975), while
others come from several other suggested or existing systems. See CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 2670-2680 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 5325-5326.95 (West Supp. 1977); Friedman, supra note 1, at 95; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 339-46; Control -of Shock Treatment, supra note
4, at 773. See also Note, Rights of Institutionalized Mental Patients: Issues, Implications, and Proposed Guidelines, 25 U. KAN. L. REv. 63, 79-85
(1976).
Although the statute is designed to aid state legislatures, courts faced
with constitutional challenges similar to those posed in Wyatt, see notes
44-45 supra and accompanying text, may find it necessary to impose regulations to protect patients' constitutional rights. The Model Statute
could be utilized in those circumstances, for the availability of a model
alleviates some of the difficulties inherent in judicial promulgation of
such standards. See note 13 supra.
79. The statute leaves certain decisions to the legislature's judgment, see, e.g., Model Statute § 4(a); note 99 infra; and legislatures
would necessarily have to choose between proposed alternatives, see,
e.g., Model Statute § 3(b).

MODEL STATUTE

1977]

the statute incorporates, and the Commentary advocates, one
approach as preferable. The Model Statute, then, should serve
as a practical aid to future reform of laws governing the administration of organic therapies.
B.

THE MODEL STATUTE

Section 1.

Statement of Purposes

(a) All competent persons have a fundamental right not to
have their thought processes, states of mind, or patterns of mentation altered through the unconsented administration of a
regulated organic therapy.
(b) The general purposes of this Statute are:
(1) to preserve the right of a competent patient to make
an informed treatment decision that is determinative;
(2) to reduce the risk that an incompetent patient will receive a regulated therapy that will not serve his best interests; and
(3) to adopt only those procedural restrictions whose marginal benefit to the patient outweighs the costs caused by
increased administrative complexity.
(c) This Statute shall be construed to protect the fundamental
right and to promote the general purposes stated in this section.
Commentary: This statement of the legislative purposes
underlying the proposed model should guide the decisionmaking
of both the Extraordinary Treatment Board 0 and a reviewing
court.8 1 The primary objective of the regulatory procedure is to
protect the patient's rights without impairing the delivery of
beneficial treatment. Thus, provisions have been incorporated
only if the resulting complexity or financial burden would
82
not hinder the effective delivery of beneficial therapy.
80. See Model Statute § 3.
81. See Model Statute § 14.
82. When designing a regulatory procedure, the legislature will inevitably be concerned with the expense of implementing particular provisions. If a patient's constitutional rights were involved, see note 8
supra, considerations of cost might have to give way; but the basic
design of this statute anticipates constitutional developments, and
most financial considerations relate to features of the statute that exceed
any proposed constitutionally required minimum. It is also important
from the standpoint of patients' interests that the system for delivering
treatment not be overly burdened by administrative complexities. While
part of the impetus for adopting regulations is to prevent unwarranted
treatments, a patient's interests would be harmed if the complexity of
the regulatory scheme impeded receipt of useful treatments. This question may also raise constitutional issues. See note 8 supra.
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Definitions

As used in this Model Statute:
(a) "patient" means an individual under observation, care, or
treatment in a hospital;
(b) "hospital" means any public or private hospital8 3 to which
an individual might be involuntarily committed;
(c)"organic therapy"8 4 refers to:
(1) psychosurgery, which includes lobotomy, sterotactic
surgery, psychiatric and behavioral surgery, and all other
forms of brain surgery performed for:
(A) modification or control of thoughts, feelings, actions, or behavior rather than the treatment of a known
and diagnosed physical disease of the brain; or
(B) modification of normal brain function or normal
brain tissue in order to modify thoughts, feelings, actions, or behavior; or
(C) treatment of abnormal brain function or abnormal
brain tissue in order to control thoughts, feelings, actions, or behavior when the abnormality is not an established cause for those thoughts, feelings, action, or
behavior;
(2) electronic stimulation of the brain by means of electrodes implanted in the brain;
(3) shock therapy, including, but not limited to, electroconvulsive or other convulsive therapy, whether effected
electrically or chemically, and insulin shock treatments;
.(4) the use of any drugs, electrical shocks, shock therapy,
electronic stimulation of the brain by means of electrodes
implanted there, or infliction of physical pain when used as
an adverse or reinforcing stimulus in a program of aversive,
classical, or operant conditioning; and
83. In some states, the laws permit involuntary commitments to private hospitals. See, e.g., MIcH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 330.1518(2) (West
1975). Whether statutory protection should extend to voluntary patients in state or private institutions, see, e.g., Note, Regulation of Convulsive Therapy, 75 MIcH. L REv. 363, 370 n.55 (1976), raises questions
beyond the scope of this Note.
84. Except for the definition of psychosurgery, this definition of organic therapy was taken from a recent California statute and the proposals that led up to its enactment. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2670-2680 (West
Supp. 1977); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 339-46. The definition of psychosurgery comes from the new California regulatory procedure. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325 (West Supp. 1977).
The organic therapies included in Model Statute § 2(c) (1) -(4) are
similar to those recognized by several state legislatures as appropriate
subjects for regulation. See STONE, supra note 6, at 105; note 14 supra.
Because the role played by psychotropic drugs in the delivery of mental
health services is likely to expand, see note 3 supra, subsection (5) permits the regulation of a significantly larger number of drug treatment
programs than do any existing regulatory procedures. For discussions of
these treatments, see sources cited in note 4 supra.
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(5) the use of any psychotropic drug,8 5 including, but not
limited to, antipsychotic, antianxiety, antidepressant, or
stimulant medication.
(d) "a regulated therapy" means any organic therapy that is
regulated pursuant to § 4(a) and § 4(b) of this Statute.
(e) a patient has "the competency to make an informed treatment decision" 8 6 if the patient has the ability to understand and
appreciate the significance of:
(1) the nature of a proposed organic therapy;
(2) the potential risks and benefits inherent in the proposed procedure; and
(3) the possible alternative courses of action.
(f) a patient's treatment decision is "an informed and voluntary treatment decision" if it is:
(1) based on an understanding of the nature and consequences of the proposed procedure; and
(2) wholly voluntary and free from duress.
Section 3.

The ExtraordinaryTreatment Board

(a) There shall be established an Extraordinary Treatment
Board [hereinafter referred to as the Board] to supervise the
administration of organic therapy in state mental hospitals.
(b) The Board shall be appointed by the governor [from a
list of qualified applicants]8 7 and shall be comprised of three
members: a board-certified psychiatrist [or a clinical psychol85. Some psychotropic drugs could be appropriate subjects for regulation. When considering the regulation of psychotropic drugs, however, it is essential to emphasize that a meaningful classification of particular drugs as regulated or nonregulated requires the simultaneous consideration of the specific treatment program within which they will be
used, that is, the dosage in each administration of the drug, the timing
of particular treatments, the overall length of time the drug will be administered, and whether any other organic therapies will be administered
simultaneously. Even a mild tranquilizing drug, for example, could produce powerful effects upon a patient when administered intensively.
See generally THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 152-200 (5th
ed. L. Goodman & A. Gilman 1975); R. SHADER, PSYCHIATRIC COmPLICATIONS OF MEDICAL DRUGS (1972); Conditioning Prisoners and Mental
Patients,supra note 4, at 623-26. This phenomenon is not unique to drug
therapies. The intrusive impact of convulsive therapies also fluctuates
according to the specific treatment program adopted. See Note, supra
note 83, at 365-69; Conditioning Prisoners and Mental Patients, supra
note 4, at 631-32.
86. This formulation of competency is modified from that outlined
by Friedman, supra note 1, at 78.
87. To insure that qualified nominees are brought to the governor's
attention, the legislature could provide that the state chapters of various
organizations, including the National Association for Retarded Citizens,
the National Association for Mental Health, the American Medical Association, and the American Bar Association, recommend individuals qualified to serve as Board members. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 95.
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ogist licensed to practice in this state]; a specialist in internal
medicine [or a neurologist] ;88 and an attorney licensed to practice law in the state.8 9
88. The appropriate size and composition of an administrative
board depends on a number of considerations: whether the board will
operate on a full time basis, whether various experts are available and
willing to serve, whether the board's decisions must be unanimous, and
whether the size of the board will permit it to function efficiently.
The composition of the administrative Board in the Model Statute
reflects the conclusion that a small board, which must make unanimous
decisions, will be able to protect the patient's interests without sacrificing
professional expertise. See note 89 infra. Because the availability of
particular personnel may be limited, however, alternative specifications
are provided. It might be extremely difficult to find both a psychiatrist
and an internist who are available and willing to serve on the Board
at the same time: the legislature could therefore provide that a psychologist could replace the former and a general practitioner the latter.'
For an example of how flexible membership qualifications could be designed to deal with this problem, see note 48 supra and accompanying
text. For the few cases involving a treatment proposal for psychosurgery, however, it is probably necessary to have a neurologist on the
Board since only a neurologist is likely to have the expertise needed
to evalute such a treatment proposal.
The Alabama Extraordinary Treatment Committee illustrates an alternative model.
The members shall be so selected that the [five member] committee will be competent to deal with the medical, psychological,
psychiatric, legal, social and ethical issues involved in such
treatment methods; to this end, at least one member shall be
a psychiatrist licensed to practice in this state; at least one member shall be a neurologist or specialist in internal medicine; and
at least one member shall be an attorney licensed to practice
law in this state.
Wyatt v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL DisAs rY L. REP. 55, 56 (M.D. Ala. July
1, 1975). The Alabama procedure does not specify whether the committee's decisions must be unanimous. If the size of the Board is increased,
a requirement of unanimity, see Model Statute § 10, will mean that fewer
regulated therapies will be approved. To avoid this, a legislature that
wanted a larger board could allow some form of majority rule. This
would cause other difficulties, however; for example, the perceived value
of having nonmedical Board members might be largely eliminated if the
medical members could control the Board's actions.
When determining the composition of the Board, a legislature should
also consider whether Board members will be employed, on a full time
basis. Because the availability of the most qualified specialists may vary
inversely with the amount of time the members will be required to spend
on Board operations, a number of part time boards might be created in
hopes of attracting the most qualified people. The availability of qualified personnel in a given area will limit the legislature's decision to establish either rotational membership or a number of part time boards.
89. Under the proposed procedure an organic therapy will be approved only if the attorney is convinced that the patient's legal rights
have not been jeopardized. See Model Statute § 10(a). The Model
assumes that an attorney's legal training and experience will cause him
to emphasize the patient's legal rights. In contrast, a doctor's training
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(c) None of the members of the Board shall be affiliated with
a state mental hospital or with the [state] Mental Health Department.
(d) Members of the Board shall serve four year [staggered]
terms 0 and shall be compensated at E
.
Commentary: Whether a court or an administrative board
should be charged with the task of implementing an organic

therapy regulatory program is a question fundamental to the
design of the regulatory scheme. The question can be analyzed by
comparing how effectively each body would accomplish two major goals of regulation: determining whether a proposed patient
has the capacity to make an informed treatment decision and
determining whether a treating physician's treatment recommendation 91 was substantively correct. 92 These two issues can be
respectively characterized as "legal" and "medical." If a patient
has the capacity to make a treatment decision, he will be legally
entitled to refuse a regulated therapy. In contrast, whether a
treatment is appropriate for a particular patient is essentially a
medical question. Characterizing these issues as "legal" or "medical" is necessarily somewhat artificial: the determination of
and experience will naturally cause him to focus on treatment. Bazelon,
Institutionalization,Deinstitutionalizationand the Adversary Process, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 897, 909-12 (1975). Placing both medical and legal professionals on the Board should give the reviewing body a perspective
that is compatible with the balancing process necessary to substantively
review an organic treatment decision.
90. The legislature could minimize the risk that certain board members might come to dominate the Board's decisionmaking by providing
for staggered rather than concurrent terms.
91. Although the psychiatric physician's ability to identify accurately those members of society who are mentally ill, to diagnose correctly the particular dysfunction, and to treat individual patients effectively, has been seriously questioned, see, e.g., Albers, Pasewark, &
Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric Testimony: The
Fallibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. U. L. REV.
11 (1977), this Note accepts the more traditional view that the expertise
of the psychiatric physician is a valuable asset in the treatment of mental
illness. Given that there are questions as to the general competence of
treating physicians, however, when the legislature considers regulatory
schemes for organic therapies of questionable efficacy, it should recognize that stronger arguments exist for heavy regulation or prohibition.
See note 24 supra.
92. The Model Statute is premised on the appropriateness of substantively reviewing a treating physician's medical judgment. This issue
is unsettled, but there is strong precedent to support such review. See,
e.g., Wyatt v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL DIsABrLTY L. REP. 55 (M.D. Ala. July
1, 1975); Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1976); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §§ 5326.6-.7 (West Supp. 1977).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:841

competency will raise a number of medical questions; the approval of a treatment may in turn affect legal rights.
To the extent that the evaluation of a patient's capacity can
be characterized as a "purely" legal issue, however, a court,
because it is designed to resolve legal issues and preserve legal
rights, is arguably the superior decisionmaker.9 3 The court's lack
of medical expertise, which could hinder it in dealing with the
medical aspects of the competency determination, could be partially remedied by reliance on medical experts.9 4 An administrative board, on the other hand, would have the independent
medical expertise to resolve the medical questions involved in
the competency issue, but might be less well equipped to decide
purely legal questions. As our system of administrative law
attests, however, administrative agencies are often entrusted
with the power to resolve issues affecting individuals' legal
rights 5 Placing a lawyer on the board and requiring unanimous
decisions would both ensure that the board has legal expertise9 6
and minimize any criticism that physicians alone were determining a patient's legal rights. Furthermore, the same due process
safeguards present in a judicial proceeding could be provided
in an administrative hearing. Finally, judicial review of the
93. One commentator has argued that a court of law is the only
appropriate forum for evaluating capacity to consent.
Capacity to consent, and thereby to exercise a legal right, like
any other question of mental capacity is primarily a legal issue.
Medical opinion may be helpful in understanding mental competency, but doctors are not trained to make a determination of
whether a person should be deprived of basic legal rights.
Informed Consent and the Mental Patient,supra note 8, at 755-56. But
see Civil Restraint, supra note 8, at 114.
This criticism, however, appeared in an evaluation of the California
regulatory system, which uses an administrative review board wholly
composed of physicians associated with the state mental health system,
see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325-5326.95 (West Supp. 1977); see
generally Control of Shock Treatment, supra note 4, at 751, and the author never investigated whether an administrative procedure could be
designed that would adequately protect a patient's legal rights.
The Model Statute minimizes the impact of the problems raised by
the author of the article quoted above by using a mixed medical and
legal review committee, see note 89 supra and accompanying text, and
requiring unanimous decisions, see Model Statute § 10(a). It also
prohibits Board members from being associated with the treating institutions. See Model Statute § 3(c).
94. But see note 98 infra.
95. "The very identifying badge of the American administrative
agency is power, without previously existing rules, to determine the legal
rights of individual parties." K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 1.07
at 20 (1972).
96. See note 89 supraand accompanying text,
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decision made by the board would provide an ultimate safeguard
9 7
for the patient's legal rights.
With respect to the ability of a court or board substantively
to review a treatment recommendation, the board's medical
expertise clearly makes it a superior decisionmaker. While
there might be some danger that medical members of the board
would be influenced by a sense of loyalty to those within their
own profession and hence defer routinely to treating physicians'
recommendations, this risk can be minimized. Formal relationships between board members and the treating facilities could be
prohibited; placing nonmedical members on the board could
counterbalance any potential undue influence from the medical
profession; and unanimous decisions by the board could be required. A court, on the other hand, while it is unlikely to be
influenced by a sense of colleagueship with physicians, might
nevertheless be more likely to rely completely on the recommendations of treating physicians or other medical experts, since
its lack of medical knowledge would prevent it from independently evaluating the appropriateness of a treatment.9 8
97. See Bazelon, supra note 89, at 910.
98. Because courts handle medical issues in other contexts, such as
medical malpractice, they arguably can handle the medical issues that
arise in reviewing an organic treatment decision. The same authors who
advance this argument, however, recognize its limitations. "Even if we
were all agreed, however, that courts do indeed soundly adjudicate matters of medical malpractice, the analogy, given present biomedical technology, is not fully persuasive." Shapiro, supra note 4, at 324. In a medical malpractice case the judge or the jury is asked to determine whether
the plaintiff's injuries were the proximate result of the defendant's failure to possess or exercise the skill and learning common to members
of that profession. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 162 (4th
ed. 1971). To compensate for the fact-finder's lack of medical expertise,
the plaintiff must produce expert testimony to support an inference that
the defendant's conduct did not conform to the appropriate standard. Id.
at 164. No such standard exists to help the decisionmaker evaluate a
prospective organic treatment decision. Compare Civil Restraint, supra
note 8, at 107.
The existence of an objective standard in a medical malpractice case
distinguishes it from the decisionmaking necessary in reviewing a treatment decision. Approval of the administration of a particular organic
therapy requires a balancing process. That the variables that must
be weighed are peculiarly medical in nature (for example, an assessment of the risks relevant to the administration of a particular therapy, in a particular manner, to an individual patient) emphasizes the
need for a decisionmaker with some medical knowledge. Since a court
cannot fully understand the reasons underlying the original prescription,
it cannot comprehensively and independently review an organic treatment proposal.
We do not suggest that the court should or can decide what particular treatment this patient requires.... We do not decide
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Perhaps the most compelling argument favoring the administrative board is one unrelated to the two major issues of
determining competency and approving treatment decisions.
An administrative board, if empowered to do so, could implement a comprehensive regulatory scheme far more readily and
efficiently than either the legislature or the courts. It would
build up a body of knowledge and a familiarity with treatment
procedures that would permit it to plan for technological develwhether the agency has made the best decision, but only make
sure that it has made a permissible and reasonable decision in
view of the relevant information and within a broad range of
discretion.

Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See Bazelon,
supra note 89, at 910. But see Wyatt v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL DIsBMnrY
L. REP. 55 (M.D. Ala. July 1, 1975) as quoted in note 45 supra. This
outline of a court's proper function dramatizes its limitations. One of
the explicit objectives of regulation is to narrow the treating physician's
existing discretion, and thus to insure that the treatment prescriptions
advance the patients' best interests. See Model Statute § 1.
Even though a court cannot fully understand the original treatment
prescription, it could rely on medical experts to perform this function.
Reliance on such experts, however, not only creates the problems noted
in the text but also involves the court in resolving conflicts of medical
opinion, a unique problem in itself. One commentator notes:
Medical evidence that there is a reasonable basis for the treatment and that it is being evaluated in a reasonable way should
allay concerns about the appropriateness of the treatment and
spare the court from immersing itself in the nuances of the biological effects of the treatment or of the statistical methods used
to determine its efficacy. Where medical opinions are divided,
a court may either require a fuller exposition of the relevant
data, recognizing the limits of its own expertise, or may take
the conservative view that efficacy is unproven.
Beresford, supra note 1, at 351. See also Civil Commitment, supra note
11, at 1333-44; Civil Restraint, supra note 8, at 114. Professor Beresford's statement, while outlining a possible standard for judicial review
of the efficacy of a treatment program, also highlights the problems
associated with judicial review of a physician's selection of a particular
treatment program. A judge will not have the expertise to determine
whether a "reasonable basis" for the treatment exists, and a more complete exposition of conflicting medical opinion, while it might dramatize
the issue, cannot provide the judge with the knowledge necessary to
resolve the dispute. Faced with this dilemma, courts may be tempted to
adopt the "conservative view" and unnecessarily deprive the proposed
patients of potentially beneficial therapy.
Conflicts about organic treatment decisions, moreover, are closer to
psychiatric malpractice than to general malpractice cases.
In physical medicine there is relative certainty compared with
psychotherapy, both in diagnosis and in the efficacy of particular
treatments. In the psychiatric malpractice field, the courts have
exhibited extreme reluctance to examine the issues of treatment
and great confusion in trying to decide when negligence has occurred.
Civil Restraint,supra note 8, at 111. The judiciary is likely to be similarly reluctant in its evaluation of organic therapy decisions,
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opments and to promulgate rules for regulating certain treatments. This is a distinct advantage, for it assures a broad and
flexible approach to the regulation of proliferating organic therapies. On balance, then, because an administrative board could
capably handle both the legal and medical issues, and because it
has the added advantage of flexibility, the administrative approach has been chosen for the Model Statute.
Section 4. The Determination of Regulated Therapies

3.99
(a) Regulated therapies shall include [
(b) The Board may on its own initiative determine which
organic therapies other than those specified in subsection (a)
warrant classification as regulated therapies. For each therapy being considered, the Board shall, after notice, hold public
hearings to receive additional information. In reaching its
decision to classify an organic therapy as a regulated therapy,
the Board shall consider:
(1) the intrusiveness of the therapy and its impact upon
the patient;
(2) the extent and quality of the available knowledge concerning the therapy's effectiveness;
(3) the potential harms and the probability of their occurrence;
(4) the risk posed by unknown harms and the probability
of their occurrence; and
(5) the administrative complications that would arise from
the decision to regulate the therapy.10 0
(c) The Board shall place an organic therapy in the
category' 0 ' whenever it determines that the risks that
apy will be administered improperly and that such
administration will jeopardize the patient's well-being

regulated
the therimproper
outweigh

99. This decision is one that each legislature must make pursuant
to the considerations discussed in notes 84-85 supra.
100. Although it raises some of the same issues, the decision to regulate a particular organic therapy is more general than the determination
of whether a specific therapy would advance the best interests of a particular patient. Compare Model Statute § 4(b) with § 12(c)-(d).
101. Whether the Board's regulatory or deregulatory decisions
should be unanimous has been left to the legislatures. Legislatures
should evaluate the impact of a unanimity requirement upon the availability of treatment and the potential risks to patients from unregulated
treatments. The decision to place a therapy in a regulated class, for
example, adds procedural complexities to the treatment process but does
not preclude patients from receiving the therapy; deregulation, however, removes the procedural safeguards and increases the risk that a
therapy may be inappropriately used. Because the patients' interests
may be more adversely affected by the latter, a unanimity requirement
might be preferable for deregulation, while a majority vote would suffice for decisions to regulate.
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the administrative or medical advantages anticipated by requiring only the treating physician's prescription.
[ (d) The Board shall also be empowered to declassify a regulated therapy. The Board shall make this decision after a public hearing and a decisionmaking process as set forth in subsections 2(b) and (c).]
Commentary: In determining which therapies fall into
the regulated category, the proposed model distinguishes between those organic therapies that are per se regulated and
those that may become regulated. 0 2 The designation of certain
organic therapies as per se regulated allows the legislature to
structure the regulatory procedure to conform to its judgment of
which therapies are potentially most dangerous, while the flexibility necessary to respond efficiently to new technological developments 1 3 is provided by the authority given to the Board to
regulate previously unregulated therapies. Thus, when new
therapies become available or new applications of existing therapies are proposed, treating physicians in states adopting the
Model Statute will not have to await legislative or judicial adjustments in the class of regulated therapies. 0 4
102. The approval of the Board must be obtained prior to the administration of a regulated therapy. See Model Statute § 5. Friedman
has proposed a tripartite classification of behavior modification techniques into regulated, monitored, and unregulated categories that could
probably be adopted for other organic therapies as well. Friedman,
supra note 1, at 96-97. A therapy in the middle group could be administered without approval, but the Board would periodically monitor its
use. The legislature could either establish the tripartite system itself or
give the Board the power to do so in a restricted set of circumstances
or whenever the Board deemed it appropriate.
Such a tripartite classification would be most useful if the legislature
wished to restrict the group of regulated therapies. Allowing the Board
to monitor the use of the most intrusive unregulated therapies would
provide the legislature with the empirical data necessary to determine
whether to expand the original group of regulated therapies. This same
observation would apply if the Board were given regulatory powers.
See note 103 infra and accompanying text.
103. Existing regulatory procedures would have to be adjusted when
new types of organic therapies are developed, see note 3 supra, or novel
applications of existing therapies, including the alteration of a specific
treatment program, see note 85 supra, are introduced.
104. The Alabama procedure, for example, provides that:
No patient ... shall be subjected to any other extraordinary or
hazardous technique or procedure not specifically mentioned
herein unless the treating psychiatrist or the medical director of
the hospital has first obtained:
a. The written approval of the Extraordinary Treatment Committee ...
; and
b. The express and informed consent of the patient in writing
to the administration of such treatment.
Wyatt v. Hardin, 1 MNTAL DIsABIITY L. REP. 55, 57 (M.D. Ala. July
1, 1975). This provision is a workable, but incomplete, response to the
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The requirement of public hearings and the access of treating physicians to the Board will also allow them to influence the
decision to regulate certain treatments. As the category of
regulated therapies expands beyond the most intrusive types of
organic therapies, such access becomes more necessary. In
determining when to extend the regulatory system, the Board
must weigh the marginal benefits to the patient against the costs
imposed by increased administrative complexities; because
treating physicians must comply with and implement the regulatory procedures, they are ideal sources of information on the
effect of increased complexity on the delivery of therapy.
The Model Statute could be designed to empower the
Board to deregulate a formerly regulated organic therapy. As a
matter of policy, the desirability of this alternative depends on
whether the value of a flexible procedure and the perceived need
for an efficient method of updating the regulatory system outweigh the advantages of a legislative determination of the class
of regulated therapies. It would seem reasonable to permit the
Board to deregulate therapies, for it would acquire empirical
knowledge from numerous applications of a treatment and be
able to assess whether the risks associated with its use had been
sufficiently reduced. On the other hand, because deregulation
may entail more serious risks of harm to patients than the initial
decision to regulate, the legislature might prefer to retain the
deregulatory decision for itself.
Section 5.

A ConditionPrecedentto Treatment

No regulated therapy shall be administered in a state mental
hospital without the express, written approval of the Board.
Section 6.

The Treating Physician's Treatment Recommenda-

(a) Prior to the administration of a regulated therapy, the
treating physician shall submit to the Board a written recommendation requesting that the Board approve the prescribed
therapy.
problem. Rather than automatically returning to the Extraordinary
Treatment Committee each time an arguably "extraordinary or hazardous" therapy is prescribed, the Committee could be authorized to specify
what "other therapies" require its approval.
105. The procedure described in this section is very similar to that
instituted by the Wyatt court. Id. at 56. See text accompanying notes
47-50 supra.
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The physician's treatment recommendation shall include:
(1) a detailed, clinical rationale for the administration of
the proposed therapy;
(2) a list of all alternative treatments that were considered
and a complete explanation of why they were rejected;
(3) a full description of the treatment program within
'which the regulated therapy will be administered;' 0 0 and
(4) the written approval of the superintendent or medical
director of the treatment facility.

(c) Upon receipt of the treatment recommendation, [one of]
the members of the Board shall interview [physically examine]
the proposed patient.10 7
(d) The Board shall have access to this patient's medical records [and treatment program].108
Commentary: This section is designed to provide the
Board with the information necessary to execute its functions.
106. The components of a complete treatment program are described
in note 85 supra.
107. The appropriate scope of this interview merits careful consideration by the legislature, for it must protect the patient's interests without creating unduly burdensome procedures. For most types of intrusive therapy, both administrative flexibility and the patient's best interests can be advanced by conducting the hearing in his presence; the
Board member should physically examine the patient prior to the treatConsistent with this approach, the Minnesota commitment statute
provides for a judicial commitment hearing "at a hospital, a public health
facility, the proposed patient's residence, or such other suitable and appropriate place as the court may determine." MmNN. STAT. § 253A.07 (13)
(1976). If this degree of flexibility were adopted, the patient would be
able to attend the treatment'hearing in all but the most exceptional circumstances.
Even if it is determined that the regulation demands only that the
Board interview the patient, for certain organic therapies the physician
Board member should physically examine the patient prior to the treatment hearing. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5326.6(d), .7(b) (West
Supp. 1977). This should certainly be a requirement for psychosurgery
and perhaps for electroconvulsive therapy, but whether it could be
implemented depends on the composition of the Board. An "effective"
examination prior to administration of these therapies probably requires
special expertise. See note 88 supra. Under the Alabama administrative procedure, a patient must receive "a complete physical examination,
including neurological examination ... ten (10) days prior to the commencement of each series of electro-convulsive treatments." Wyatt v.
Hardin, 1 MENTAL DIsABILITY L. REP. 55, 57 (M.D. Ala. July 1, 1975).
108. The Minnesota Hospitalization and Commitment Act requires
that a written plan be devised for each hospitalized individual that "describe[s] in behavioral terms the case problems, and the precise goals,
including the expected period of time for hospitalization, and the specific
measures to be employed in the solution or easement of said problems."
MmNN. STAT. § 253A.17 (9) (1976). The suggestion that the Board have
access to such treatment plans could be adopted by states that have similar statutory provisions.
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On the assumption that the necessarily more comprehensive
information available to the treating physician will be useful to
the Board, the physician is required to state the reasons supporting the treatment proposal. Requiring the Board to interview
the patient is also intended to elicit necessary information.
Section 7.

The Consent of the Patient

(a) In conjunction with the treatment recommendation made
to the Board, the treating physician shall seek the patient's
written consent to the proposed treatment.
(b) It shall be the responsibility of the treating physician to
communicate directly to the patient in language that the patient
can understand:
(1) the nature and seriousness of the patient's disorder;
(2) the procedures to be used in administering the proposed therapy;
(3) the potential benefits that the patient might derive
from the therapy;
(4) the nature, degree, and duration of the side effects and
the significant risks of the treatment that are commonly
known to the medical profession;
(5) the probability that either the benefits or the hazards
associated with the therapy will materialize;
(6) the existence of conflicting medical opinion as to the
efficacy of the proposed treatment and/or its potential risks
and side effects, if such conflict exists; and
(7) the alternative treatments available and the reasons for
the physician's recommendation of this particular therapy.10 9
109. Merely listing the factors exposes the problems inherent in the
development of such an informational standard by raising the following
questions: (1) How much detail is required adequately to inform a patient? (2) What details will be counterproductive because they confuse
the patient? (3) Should the informational standard be modified for different therapies and different patients?
The informational standard outlined in the Model Statute is a modified version of California's standard. CAI- WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.2
(West Supp. 1977). Although the California legislature had previously
adopted a more detailed informational standard for the administration
of organic therapy in prisons, CAL. PENAL CODE § 2673 (West Supp. 1977),
the provision did not appear to require communication of more information.
In developing an informational standard, the legislature will necessarily write in generalities, and even if it did not require administrative
interpretation, the Board would be forced by practicalities to make such
interpretations. In light of these realities, the legislature should establish a general standard and allow the Board to particularize it for each
regulated therapy, much as California has done with written consent
forms. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.3 (West Supp. 1977).
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The written consent 1 o signed by the patient shall include:
(1) a statement of the nature of the treatment to which he
has consented;
(2) a description of the purposes, risks, and possible consequences of the treatment;
(3) a statement of the probable duration and intensity of
the proposed therapy and whether such therapy would have
to be continued indefinitely for optimum therapeutic results;
[and]
[(4)111 a notice that a person does not waive his right to
refuse any organic therapy by having previously given his
informed consent, and that he may withdraw his consent at
any time. After the patient withdraws his previous informed consent, the attending physician may gradually
phase out the therapy rather than immediately terminating
it, if sound medical-psychiatric practice suggests that sudden cessation would create a serious risk of mental or physical harm.]"1 2

110. Even if the legislature elects to determine the information a patient should receive prior to the administration of a particular therapy,
the Board could develop consent forms for individual therapies. See
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.3 (West Supp. 1977). This form, whose
general substance would be identical to the information provided orally
by the physician, would guide the physician in explaining the procedure
to the patient and ensure that the patient will receive the information
necessary to make an informed consent. If the patient is illiterate, the
consent form could be read to him as part of the oral explanation.
111. The substance of this notice provision is based on CAL. PENAL
CODE § 2670.5 (d) (West Supp. 1977).
112. A competent individual, or a formerly incompetent patient who
Tegains his capacity during the course of treatment, should be entitled
to withdraw his consent and halt further treatment.
The Alabama administrative procedure accepted this principle as
basic and provided that
[a] competent patient may withdraw his consent to ECT at any
time and for any reason. A patient who is incompetent at the
inception of a course of treatment may refuse to participate in
further treatments at any time that he is restored to competence.
Such withdrawal of consent or refusal to participate may be
either oral or written and is to be given effect immediately.
Wyatt v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 55, 57 (M.D. Ala. July
1, 1975). Accord, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7(h) (West Supp.
1977).
Since disorientation of the patient is one of the objectives of an
electroconvulsive therapy treatment program, a patient is likely to become destabilized during the course of treatment, see Schwartz, supra
note 4, and a competent patient, who had previously consented to the
therapy, is likely to want to withdraw his consent before the course of
therapy is completed. Thus, for some organic therapies administered
seriatim, it might be necessary to interpret a competent patient's initial
consent as a waiver of the future right to withdraw from that treatment
program; but a competent patient should certainly retain the right to
refuse psychosurgery until the time of the operation. See, e.g., CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6 (d) (West Supp. 1977).
Withdrawal of consent by a patient who is incompetent prior to the
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(d) The treating physician's recommendation to the Board
shall include his opinion of the patient's capacity to make an
informed treatment decision.
(e) When the treating physician believes that the patient
clearly lacks the capacity to make an informed treatment decision, and that no therapeutic purpose would be served by providing such information, the physician need not seek the patient's consent but must clearly note in the treatment proposal
that the patient's consent was not received.113
[(f) When the treating physician believes that a patient's
physical or emotional well-being would be jeopardized by provision of all the information necessary to establish an informed
consent, he should seek the patient's consent based on the partial information provided but should indicate in the treatment
recommendation the relevant information the patient did not
receive.] 114
initiation of the treatment program raises a different issue. The Alabama procedure purports to give such a patient the absolute right to
withdraw consent upon regaining capacity. Since the only way to test
the patient's competency would be to return to the treatment committee
or to a court, sie CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7(h) (West Supp. 1977),
some type of waiver provision would be a practical necessity in this situation as well.
An absolute right to withdraw consent could create further difficulties. Once the administration of a therapy has begun, it might be harmful to the patient to withdraw the therapy suddenly. A medical need to
remove the patient gradually from the refused therapy will, in practice, limit the patient's right to refuse. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2670.5(d)
(West Supp. 1977).
The provision of a right to withdraw consent could also prove
'troublesome if a patient consented and withdrew consent numerous times
during the course of a treatment; this could conceivably impede the
whole treatment program. Avoidance of this problem appears to necessitate some limitation on a patient's right to withdraw consent. Thus,
although the theoretical framework of the Model Statute would otherwise require the inclusion of this provision, because of the complex
administrative problems outlined above, this judgment would best be
made after careful legislative consideration of its benefits and disadvantages.
113. This section is intended to apply only to those situations in
which the patient is completely unable to understand and, due to this
lack of understanding, to communicate with the physician, thus making
it a pointless exercise to require the physician to attempt to gain an
informed consent.
114. Although it might be argued that the patient has a right to the
most complete information available, the analogous tort doctrine of "informed consent" was never absolute, and sound policy principles appear
to support the recognized exception.
Beginning with a decision in Kansas in 1960, it began to be recognized that this was really a matter of the standard of professional conduct, since there will be some patients to whom disclosure may be undesirable or even dangerous for success of the
treatment or the patient's own welfare; and that what should
be done is a matter for professional judgment in the light of
the applicable medical standards. Accordingly, the prevailing
view now is that the action, regardless of its form, is in reality
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Commentary: This section of the proposed model is designed to provide the patient with the information necessary to
make an informed treatment decision, an objective that is relatively straightforward and needs little commentary. The informational standard itself illustrates the tension among protecting
the patient's right to be informed, establishing a procedure that
can be easily administered, and adjusting the informational requirements when the patient's capacity so requires.
Section 8.

The Role of the Patient's Natural or Legal Guardian

(a) The patient,' 15 the patient's guardian (either natural or
legal), or the patient's attorney may initiate a treatment hearing
by direct petition to the Board. Upon receipt of such a petition
the Board may direct the appropriate treating physician to complete a treatment recommendation containing a detailed clinical
rationale for not administering the requested therapy.
-(b) The patient's guardian shall have the right to attend the
treatment hearing outlined in section 9 and to present evidence
before the Board.
(c) In reaching a decision on the treatment recommendation,
the Board shall consider the opinion of the patient's legal or
natural guardian as an independent representative of the patient's interests.
Commentary: The guardian's role in the formulation of a
treatment decision has been ignored by a majority of existing
procedures. 116 While the Model Statute recognizes that it would
be inappropriate to delegate the ultimate responsibility for the
treatment decision of an involuntarily confined mental patient to
one for negligence in failing to conform to the proper standard,
to be determined on the basis of expert testimony as to what
disclosure should be made.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 165 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes
omitted). See STONE, supra note 6, at 104. The California legislature,
however, appears to have either eliminated or severely restricted a physician's discretion not to disclose certain risks when he believes the
knowledge would be harmful to the patient. See note 109 supra.
Under the Model Statute the Board makes the treatment decision
for incompetent patients, and thus proper administration of the therapy
does not depend on their execution of an informed treatment decision.
For clearly incompetent patients, the physician could be allowed some
discretion in the amount of information disclosed about the proposed
therapy. If the Board is uncertain of the patient's competency, the patient should be provided with all the information before his treatment
decision becomes determinative. See Model Statute § 13 (b). Any other
resolution of this issue would conflict with the principle of an informed
treatment decision.
115. Cf. MINN. STAT. § 253A.16(2) (1976) (patient may initiate
administrative hearing to review his continued confinement).
116. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL DIsABmiT L. REP. 55
(M.D. Ala. July 1, 1975); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 71.05.370 (1975).
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a parent or legal guardian, 1 1 such an individual could be immensely valuable in helping the Board determine what treatment
would serve the patient's best interests. Whenever the patient's
guardian believes the patient could benefit from a particular
therapy, 1 8 he may request a Board hearing even though the
treating physician has not recommended such treatment.
Permitting the guardian to attend the treatment hearing
and directing the Board to consider his views provides the
guardian with an opportunity to advance the best interests of his
ward. Because the Board retains the ultimate decisionmaking
authority, the danger of relying too heavily on the guardian's
capabilities is eliminated." 9
Section 9. The Board's Treatment Hearing
(a) After providing the patient and the individuals specified

in section 10(c) with adequate notice, the Board shall conduct
an administrative hearing upon each treatment recommendation
it receives.
(b) The Board shall determine at such hearing:
(1)whether the proposed patient has the competency to
make an informed treatment decisioh; and
(2) whether the patient's treatment decision was in fact
informed and voluntary.
Commentary: This section outlines the threshhold issues

the Board must resolve in the treatment hearing-whether the
individual has the ability to assimilate the relevant information,
whether the relevant information has actually been communicated to the patient, and whether the patient's ultimate decision was
free and voluntary. Because the last two deficiencies can be
cured, the key issue becomes the patient's ability to understand
the relevant information.
Any determination of competency requires the Board to
determine how much understanding constitutes "capacity." The
standard adopted in this section is that of the hypothetical,
ordinary, uncommitted patient, who will rarely understand all
the intricacies or implications of the information he receives when
making the same type of treatment decision. The definition of
capacity is intended to eliminate any requirement that the capacity of the individual be evaluated under a subjective "reasonable117. See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
118. Requests for therapies may raise numerous issues related to the
allocation of resources; therapies might be unavailable due to lack of
staff or funds. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 99. It is beyond the scope

of this Note to consider how these problems should be resolved.
119.

See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
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ness" or "rationality" criteria. 120 The competency formulation
specifically directs the Board to focus only on whether the
patient has the ability to decide, not whether he has exercised
that ability in a "reasonable" manner. Thus, in determining the
patient's competency to make an informed treatment decision,
the Board should not consider whether or not the proposed
121
patient has actually consented to the therapy.
Section 10. The Patient'sRights in the Administrative Hearing
(a)

The Board shall approve the administration of a regulated

therapy only upon the unanimous agreement of its members
that each condition necessary to approve a treatment recommendation has been met.
(b) The patient shall be present at the administrative hearing
[unless, in the Board's judgment, the patient's physical 22
and
emotional condition prevents the patient from attending.]1
(c) The following parties shall have the right to attend the
treatment hearing and present evidence before the Board:
(1) the patient's legal or natural guardian;
(2) the patient's counsel; and
(3) the treating physician or a representative of the treatment facility.
(d) The Board shall have the power to call and examine as
witnesses:
(1) members of the patient's family;
(2) members of the hospital staff; and
(3) any other individual who, in the Board's judgment,
could contribute relevant information.
(e) The patient has a right to be represented by counsel at
the hearing, and,
if unrepresented, counsel shall be appointed
12 3
by the Board.
120. There is a atural, but unfortunate, tendency to make capacity
dependent on the "rationality" of the patient's decision. See Price v.
Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1976).
The ability to decide
should be clearly distinguished from the "reasonableness" of the decision
actually made. Civil Commitment, supra note 11, at 1212-22, 1344.
121. As Friedman, supra note 1, at 77, recognized:
Any determination of the reasonableness of a result is based on
the balancing of complex factors and is likely to be subjective.
Thus, adoption of this standard may result in a Catch-22 logicany decision with which the reviewer of competency disagreed
would provide a basis for labelling the client incompetent and
for substituting the reviewer's opinion as to the best result for
the client.
See Shapiro, supra note 4, at 311-13; Civil Commitment, supra note 11,
at 1217.
122. See note 107 supra.
123. This provision is adopted from the Alabama procedure, Wyatt
v. Hardin, 1 MENTAL DIsABuTY L. REP. 55, 56 (M.D. Ala. July 1, 1975).
In Alabama, the list of counsel is compiled by a committee and approved
by the court, but appointment of counsel is by the Board. A useful guide
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(f) The patient shall have the right to present evidence at
the hearing and to examine witnesses testifying for another
party.
(g) Informal evidentiary rules shall govern the hearing.
Commentary: This section sets out certain provisions designed to protect the patient's interests at the administrative
hearing. The establishment of a forum in which all interested
parties can present their opinions rests on the assumption that
the Board will be better able to reach a decision that is in the
patient's best interests after a complete exploration of the issues.
By providing the patient with counsel, the Model Statute allows
the patient independently to influence the Board's decision. 2 4
Section 11.
tient

The Decisionmaking Process for a Competent Pa-

(a) When the Board determines that the patient has the competency to make an informed treatment decision, the patient's
refusal to consent to the25administration of a regulated therapy
shall be determinative.
to legislatures seeking an effective means of implementing the right to
counsel is New York's establishment of the Mental Health Information
Service, N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.09 (McKinney Supp. 1976), which
functions as a legal aid service to ensure that patients are adequately
represented in commitment processes. Similar agencies for other states
have been proposed. Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for
Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 iss. L.J. 43, 75-86 (1974). This type of state agency would
provide trained and experienced counsel to represent patients in their
treatment hearings. For empirical studies of the effectiveness of the
New York system, see id. at 64-72; Gupta, New York's Mental Health
Information Service: An Experiment in Due Process, 25 RUTGERS L.
REV. 405 (1971).
124. The scope of the right to counsel and the role that counsel
should play has been examined by other authors. See, e.g., Litwack, The
Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings: Emerging Problems,
62 CALm. L. REV. 816 (1974).
125. By making the treatment decision of a competent patient determinative, the Model Statute departs from the rationale of existing commitment statutes and highlights the inconsistencies between the theory
underlying the state's power to commit and the practices actually permitted by such legislation. When the patient has been committed under
the state's parens patriae power, the state acts to protect his best interests. See note 18 supra. Theoretically, a patient confined for treatment
under the parens patriae power should be unable to make his own treatment decision. Because the existing commitment standards are so broad,
however, a competent patient could also be involuntarily confined. See
note 18 supra.
According to the logic underlying the Model Statute, the Board's
determination that an individual has the capacity to make his own treatment decision would theoretically preclude the state from confining him
involuntarily under the parens patriae power, A patient's continued
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(b) When the Board determines that the patient has the competency to make an informed treatment decision, and the patient consents to the therapy, the Board shall further determine
whether the patient's treatment decision was in fact informed
and voluntary.
(c) In making this determination, the Board shall consider the
adequacy of the information provided the patient under section
7.126

(d) A competent patient's involuntary or uninformed consent
shall be construed as a denial of consent and shall preclude the
imposition of the proposed therapy until such defective consent
is cured pursuant to subsection (e).
(e) The Board shall make arrangements to cure, any defect in
the patient's treatment decision relating to the inadequacy of
the information
received or the involuntariness of the deci27
sion.1
(f) The Board shall approve the administration of the recommended therapy for a competent mental patient whose positive
treatment decision was in fact informed and voluntary.12

Section 12. The Decisionmaking Process for an Incompetent
Patient
(a) The Board shall have the power to ipprove the administration of a regulated therapy for a patient who, as the Board
has determined, lacks the competency to make an informed
treatment decision.
involuntary confinement could not be constitutionally justified unless
he could be classified as "dangerous." See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975) (a state cannot constitutionally confine, "without more,"
a nondangerous individual). See note 8 supra.
126. Because of the "inherently coercive nature of confinement" in
a state mental health facility, the Board must scrutinize carefully the
information provided to the patient and the voluntariness of the consent
to guard against the exertion of subtle pressures on the patient to consent
to a therapy. See Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. No.
73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973), summarized
at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (1973) and [1973] 13 CRUm. L. REP. (BNA) 2452.
127. If a patient's treatment decision were simply uninformed, the
Board would be able to provide the patient with the necessary information. If a patient's consent were not voluntary, however, the patient
might have to be transferred to another institution in order to eliminate
subtle coercive influences. Thus, the legislature should seriously consider providing the Board with authority to order the patient's transfer.
128. This provision conforms to the decision in Aden v. Younger, 57
Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Ct. App. 1976), which emphasized
the constitutional limitations on the state's ability to interfere with the
treatment decision of a competent patient. See notes 55 & 60 supra. This
section of the Model Statute assumes, however, that a competent patient
could not execute an informed consent to a medically inappropriate therapy since by definition the information communicated to the patient pursuant to section 7 would have been erroneous.
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(b) The Board shall approve the treatment recommendation
only if it determines that:
(1) all other less intrusive forms of treatment that are
medically appropriate for the patient's condition would be
ineffective; and
(2) the administration of the proposed treatment is consistent with the patient's best interests.
(c) In evaluating whether the administration of the proposed
therapy is consistent with the patient's best interests, the Board
shall consider:
(1) the evidence presented at the administrative hearing;
(2) the written recommendation of the treating physician
prepared pursuant to section 6;
(3) the results of an interview [and/or physical examination] with the patient conducted by [one of] the Board
members; and
(4) the possibility that an effective alternative mode of
treatment might be developed in the future;
(d) A therapy shall be in the patient's best interest if. the
Board determines that the potential benefits
to the patient out120
weigh the possible dangers or risks.
Commentary: If a patient has the capacity to make an
informed treatment decision, the Board's decisionmaking process
pursuant to section 11 is relatively simple. Once the patient
refuses the therapy, that decision is determinative.
For a
patient who consents, the Board must inquire further to insure
that he has been adequately informed and that his decision is
voluntary.
If a patient lacks the capacity to make an informed treatment decision, the Model Statute follows the traditional parens
patriae approach under which the Board's ultimate objective is
to protect the patient's best interests. 130 Since it is assumed that
the more intrusive of two equally appropriate therapies would
never serve the patient's best interests, the Board is required to
approve appropriate therapies in an ascending order of intrusiveness. Once it determines which "appropriate therapy" is the
least intrusive, the Board must further evaluate the potential
risks and benefits associated with the administration of that
therapy to the proposed patient. The medical qualifications of
the members should permit the Board to conduct this evaluation
effectively.
129. Since the entire rationale for regulating therapies is the dangers
associated with their administration, a proposed treatment should be disapproved whenever the threshhold issues cannot be satisfactorily resolved in favor of treatment. See Model Statute § 13.
130. See note 18 supra.
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Section 13. The Decisionmaking Process for a Patient Whose
Capacity to Make an Informed Treatment Decision Cannot Be
131
Clearly Determined
(a) In the event that the Board is uncertain whether the
proposed patient has the competency to make an informed
treatment decision, the Board shall further consider whether:
(1) the proposed therapy is the least intrusive medically
appropriate therapy available; and
(2) the administration of the proposed therapy would serve
the patient's best interests.
(b) If the Board determines that the proposed therapy is the
least intrusive medically appropriate therapy available, and if
the administration of the proposed' therapy would be in the best
interests of the patient, then the Board. shall:
(1) approve the administration of the proposed therapy if
the patient has consented; -or
(2) not approve the administration 'of the proposed therapy if the patient has refused to consent.
Commentary: This section exists to restrict the risk that
the Board will act contrary to the expressed wishes of a competent patient. Once the patient consents to the treatment prescription and the Board determines that the administration of the
proposed therapy, as the least intrusive medically appropriate
alternative, would serve the patient's best interests, it should
grant its approval. The question of competency is irrelevant since
administration of the proposed therapy would be proper whether
or not the patient were competent. If the patient is competent,
his decision to be treated is determinative, as it should be; if the
patient is incompetent, the Board could still approve the administration of this therapy because it has already found the treatment
to be in the patient's best interests.
The situation is similar when the patient refuses the
administration of the proposed therapy. Effectuating the patient's refusal makes the decision of the competent patient determinative. Although this procedure prevents an incompetent
patient from receiving a regulated therapy that would serve his
best interests, the overriding need to respect the decision of a
competent patient justifies this sacrifice in this group of cases.
Section 14.

Review of the Board's Decision

(a) The Board shall maintain written records of its determinations and the reasons therefor. These records shall be avail131. This portion of the proposal follows a scheme developed in
Wexler, Reflections on the Legal Regulation -of Behavior Modification in
Institutional Settings, 17 A~iz. L. RtEv. 132 (1975).
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able for examination by patient's counsel and a reviewing court
in camera.
(b) The patient, his legal guardian, or any interested member
of the patient's family is entitled to seek review of the Board's
decision on the record in a court of competent jurisdiction.
(c) If the patient, the patient's legal guardian, a member of
the patient's family, or the patient's attorney shall timely indicate in writing an intention to seek judicial review pursuant to
subsection (d), no regulated therapy shall be commenced unless
and until authorization is received from the court to which the
matter is presented.
(d) The mere notice of an intention to seek review shall not
preclude the administration of a regulated therapy
unless the
1 32 appeal is actually perfected within ten days.
Commentary: One of the key features of an administrative regulation of organic therapy is the provision for judicial
review. When the Board has not fulfilled its function, the
affected parties can petition a court for review. Because automatic review of the Board's initial decision would create an
unnecessarily burdensome procedure, the Model Statute represents a compromise. Upon receipt of a request for review, the
court should determine on the record whether the decision of the
Board was clearly erroneous. If there was such error, the reviewing court should proceed de novo rather than remand to
33
the Board for reconsideration.
Section 15.

Emergency Exception

Notwithstanding the other provisions of this statute, when the
life of the patient is in serious danger, as determined by the
treating physician in consultation with the medical director of
the facility, and there is insufficient time for a Board review
of the treatment recommendation, a regulated therapy may be
administered without the Board's consent. The necessity for
the therapy shall 34be documented and entered into the patient's
medical records.1
132. In determining the appropriate time within which to allow an
appeal from the Board's decision, the legislature should weigh the importance of timely treatment against the right of a patient to have meaningful access to the appeals process. Since FED. R. Civ. P. 59(b) requires a motion for a new trial to be served within ten days, there
appears to be no reason to provide an extended period in this situation.
133. If the legislature adopts a system of rotational membership or
multiple boards, see note 88 supra, it could require the reviewing court
to remand the case to a board with different members for rehearing.
134. This emergency provision is based upon the Michigan statute.
See note 31 supra.
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Section 16. Legal Remedies
(a) Any physician who intentionally violates the provisions
of this statute shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more
than [
]. The Attorney General may bring a civil action
to assess and collect this penalty.
(b) The penalty provided in this section shall not be construed to bar any other remedy the patient may have under
law.13 5

IV. CONCLUSION
The Model Statute is not intended to .represent the only
appropriate method for regulating the administration of organic
therapy. Many factors peculiar to individual states, including
the existing mental health system, financial constraints in the
state budget, and the propensities of state legislatures, will necessarily influence the quality of mental health care. Because the
Model Statute represents a workable balance between the competing interests that mold any regulatory procedure, it is perhaps
most useful as a standard by which legislatures could judge the
efficacy of proposed or existing regulatory systems. Many of
the existing regulatory deficiencies outlined by this Note appear
to result from legislatures' inadvertent failures to adequately
explore all the implications of proposed regulatory schemes. If
this hypothesis is accurate, the Model Statute's alternative regulatory provisions and emphasis on the balance of competing
interests underlying the various provisions will provide a useful
tool for both the reform of existing schemes, and implementation
of new procedures in the future.

135. This provision is substantially the same as a provision of the
California law. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.9 (b), (d) (West Supp.
1977).

